



चिदानन्द पण्डित विरचितः

दीक्षितरत्नावली

मीमांसाभाष्यपरिशिष्टेन तन्त्ररहस्येन च सहितः

Edited by

Mahāmahopādhyāya

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi



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Preface

This volume contains three पूर्वमीमांसा works. नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव of Chidananda Pandita gives an exposition of the doctrines of Bhāta Mīmāṃsā. Tantra Rahasya of Dharmapuri Ramanujacharya gives an exposition of the doctrines of Prābhākaras. One follows श्लोकवार्तिक of Kumārila Bhatta and शास्त्रदीपिका of Parthasarathy Mishra.

The other follows प्रकरणपञ्चिका of Śālikanātha. These are large works. The doctrines discussed at a high level. These large works are presented in a simple and lucid way.

The third work viz. मीमांसाभाष्यपरिशिष्ट of शालिकनाथ is a brief commentary on शाबरभाष्य तर्कपाद portion. It explains भाष्य text according to Prābhākaras interpretation. In these three works included in the present volume. This is very useful for a comparative study of the two schools of पूर्वमीमांसा. Full details of these doctrines are given in the introduction to these two works. It is hoped these will be useful to the students of पूर्वमीमांस and research scholars in मीमांस.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi

नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव

Introduction

Chidananda gives an exposition of Pūrvamīmāṃsa doctrines, particularly, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsa Doctrines in नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव (N.T.) It reviews the Prābhākara's doctrines on each of these topics. It also criticises Buddhists doctrines wherever these are opposed to Vedic doctrines in general, and Pūrvamīmāṃsa doctrines in particular. Interestingly Advaita Vedānta view of Ātmaikya is criticised and ātmabheda is established. The śruti passages that are quoted in support of Advaita are interpreted differently.

This work is modeled on śloka-vārtika of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa and Tarkapāda portion of Pārthasārathi's Śāstradīpika. The topics are arranged in the same way in which these are arranged as in Śāstradīpika.

However a few subtopics are considered as separate topics and the total number of topics is raised to fortyfour.

The discussions start with Adhyayanavidhi. The injunction for the study of Veda i.e. स्वाध्यायो अध्येतव्या. The Prābhākaras claim that it is not a separate injunction. It is consequential of Adhyāpana vidhi. They quote the statement अष्टवर्षं ब्राह्मणं उपनयीत तं अध्यापयित in support of their contention.

This statement enjoys Adhyāpana to a teacher. This Adhyāpana cannot be managed without Adhyayana. Hence Adhyāpana also is enjoying as consequential programme.

The important difference between Adhyayana vidhi and Adhyāpana vidhi is that, for Adhyāpana vidhi there is नियोज्य. One who wants to teach is a नियोज्य here, while there is no नियोज्य for Adhyayana vidhi. This is because, no result is mentioned for Adhyayana.

This contention of Prābhākaras is rejected by Bhāṭṭas. Adhyāpana is meant for earning livelihood, while Adhyayana is a nitya duty. The statement यो अनधीत्य द्विजो वेदान् states प्रत्यवाय for Anadhyayana. Hence Adhyayana is nityakarma while Adhyāpana is only for livelihood. Hence it is Anitya karma. Anityakarma cannot supercede Nityakarma. Further, by teaching one boy the purpose of Adhyāpana is over. Consequently, the other boys will lose the opportunity. As regards the point made that no result is stated for Adhyayana and hence it does not elicit नियोज्य. It may be clarified that elderly persons advise the upanīta boy to undertake the study. This is a sufficient ground for undertaking the study. Therefore Adhyayana vidhi is a separate injunction and not a consequential of Adhyāpana vidhi. नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव presents these main points and puts forward several other arguments.

कार्यवाद

In the next chapter नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव takes up the concept of कार्य for discussion. It is a very important concept of Prābhākaras. It has three dimentions. It is conveyed only by Vedic injunction but not by any other pramāṇa. For this reason it is designated as

- 1) अपूर्व i.e. मानान्तरापूर्व
- 2) It elicits an agent who is entitled to undertake the कार्य. such a person is called a नियोज्य and the injunctive suffix that elicits him is नियोग.
- 3) It inculcates a sense of accomplishing a task as this is my task. Therefore it is called कार्य. It is this कार्य that is conveyed by the Vedic injunction. In view of these three roles the meaning of injunctive suffix is called कार्य, नियोग and अपूर्व. The task to be achieved by the performance of याग. Hence, याग is the subject matter i.e. विषय of कार्य. It is also a करण i.e. instrument. This role of याग is stated as विषयकरणीयम्.

The injunctive suffix conveys कृति i.e. initiative also. No कार्य can be accomplished without initiative. Therefore कृति i.e. initiative is also included in the meaning of injunctive suffix. The initiative has to operate through an activity. The activity of यागक्रिया gives a form to कार्य conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Therefore यागक्रिया is the content of कार्य i.e. विषय of कार्य.

It is also करण, not in the sense that it produces कार्य but in the sense that it gives a form to it. The कृति is called भावना as it leads to कार्य i.e. is भाव्य, i.e. goal. Keeping this role of कृति in mind कार्य is defined as कृत्युद्देश्यम् and कृतिप्रधानं कार्यम्. When यागक्रिया is duly performed कार्य is accomplished. In this accomplished state it is something unique. Therefore it is called अपूर्व. To distinguish the two usages of अपूर्व, it is called पण्डापूर्व at that state.

According to Prābhākaras it is with this कार्य that all other items get connected. नियोज्य, the याग and the अङ्ग's i.e. auxiliaries, get connected. In view of this a vedic sentence conveys its meaning as connected with कार्य. This is technically known as कार्यव्युत्पत्ति. This कार्यताज्ञान conveyed by the injunctive suffix i.e. प्रवर्तक.

One proceeds to undertake यागक्रिया with the thought इदं मम कार्यम्. This is my task as conveyed by the injunctive suffix. This scheme of the operation of कार्य and the concept of कार्य is not acceptable to Bhāttas. They question the very definition of कार्य as कृत्युद्देश्यम् and कृतिप्रधान. These two terms cannot properly be explained by Prābhākaras. They do not also accept the theory of कार्यव्युत्पत्ति and प्रवर्तकत्व of कार्यताज्ञानम्. Even such statements that have no verb with the injunctive suffix do convey their meaning. For example the statement अग्निहोत्रं

ज्युहोति does convey its meaning. Therefore it is not necessary to accept कार्यव्युत्पत्ति and consider कार्यताज्ञान as प्रवर्तक. There can be सिद्धेव्युत्पत्ति. इष्टसाधनताज्ञान is प्रवर्तक. Hence Prābhākaras concept of कार्य and the scheme of नियोज्य etc. getting connected with कार्य cannot be accepted.

It may be noted here that Prābhākaras do not accept Bhāṭṭa's scheme of शाब्दीभावना and आर्थीभावना. However, their very concept of कार्य corresponds to शाब्दीभावना and the concept of कृति corresponds to आर्थीभावना. नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव concentrates on the main points

- 1) the nature of कार्य, i.e. कृत्युद्देश्यम् and कृतिप्रधानम् cannot be properly explained.
- 2) कार्यव्युत्पत्ति is not the only way of व्युत्पत्ति but सिद्धेव्युत्पत्ति is also possible.
- 3) कार्यताज्ञान is not प्रवर्तक. But इष्टसाधनता ज्ञान is प्रवर्तक.

प्रामाण्यवाद

The साङ्ख्यics consider that both प्रामाण्य and अप्रामाण्य are स्वतः. This claim of साङ्ख्यics is based on their सत्कार्यवाद theory. Hence, नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव examines the very theory of सत्कार्य quoting the well-known साङ्ख्यकारिका verse, viz असदकरणात् उपादानग्रहणात् etc., stating the arguments of sāṅkhyas in detail, rejects the सत्कार्यवाद theory and also rejects स्वतस्त्व concept of both प्रामाण्य and अप्रामाण्य.

The Nyāyavaiśeṣikas state that both प्रामाण्य and अप्रामाण्य are परतः. प्रामाण्य requires गुण while अप्रामाण्य requires दोष. Hence both are परतः. This theory is also rejected. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas प्रामाण्य is स्वतः viz. प्रामाण्य does not require any more causes than the causes required for the generation and the cognition of प्रमा. The expression परतः means अप्रामाण्य does require some additional causes other than causes required to generate अप्रमा. For example the cognition of the validity of सत्य रजत does not require any additional cause to comprehend it, while the cognition of invalidity of शुक्ति रजत requires दोषज्ञान.

In respect of the स्वतस्त्व of प्रामाण्य. A question arises. How to determine the प्रामाण्य when there is a doubt? and if the प्रामाण्य is स्वतः how can the doubt arise? It is already stated above that for अप्रामाण्य, दोषs are the ground. Such दोषशङ्का leads to the संशय in the case of प्रमा also. This is removed by checking अर्थक्रियाकारित्व of the knowledge concerned and also समर्थप्रवृत्तिजनकत्व.

Now a further question viz., अर्थक्रियाकारित्व is of the form of cognition. Therefore this also has to be verified by another cognition. This leads to अनवस्था or infinite regress. This contention is rejected by pointing out that अर्थक्रिया is of the nature of result i.e. फल. Once the फल is obtained, there will be no doubt any more.

कालप्रक्षयतावाद

काल i.e. time is प्रत्यक्ष, because it is विभु and other than मनस्.

कालः प्रत्यक्षः अमनस्त्वे सति विभुत्वात् आत्मवत्

Those who consider काल i.e. time as अनुमेय argue that we have experiences of earlier, later, simultaneous etc. By these experiences काल i.e. time, has to be inferred. Here the position is, these very terms refer to काल i.e., time, and this is प्रत्यक्ष. Therefore there is no need to infer काल i.e. time, by these experiences.

अन्यथाख्यातिवादः

In the definition of प्रमा, two clauses viz., अनधिगत not already know and तत्त्व are included.

The first clause is included to exclude स्मृति and अनुवाद. While the second clause is included to exclude wrong knowledge. The Prābhākaras object for this. According to Prābhākaras all cognition are true. Even शुक्ति रजत cognition is true. The statement इदं रजतम् represents two cognitions. The expression इदं refers to शुक्ति without reference its special characteristic viz., शुक्तित्व, in a general way as इदं. This is true. रजतं refers to रजत remembered. It is स्मरणात्मक as स्मरणात्मक रजत is also true. But the distinction between the two is not realised. There

is भेदाग्रह. It is this भेदाग्रह that leads to the व्यवहार as इदं रजतम्. According to the Prābhākaras there is no सामानाधिकरण्य here, but there is only सारूप्य. This is sufficient for व्यवहार and प्रवृत्ति. When it is realised as this is not रजत, it is only the व्यवहार that is sublated. This theory of Prābhākaras is known as अख्याति theory. This is discussed in detail in this section and it is pointed out that, the concept of भेदाग्रह cannot be properly explained. It ultimately leads to अन्यथाख्याति. Though the larger portion of this section is devoted to the discussion of भेदाग्रह and mainly deals with Prābhākaras theory of आख्यातिवाद. It is given the title अन्यथाख्यातिवाद in the light of the conclusion arrived at in favour of अन्यथाख्यातिवाद.

साक्षात् प्रतीति निरासवादः

Prābhākaras define प्रत्यक्ष as साक्षात् प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षम्. Here नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव points out that the expression साक्षात् cannot be properly explained. If it is explained as स्वकाल एवयत् सत् तदवभासित्वम् then घटज्ञान cannot be considered as साक्षात्, since, घट will be present before and afterwards. It is true अनुमान is also स्वकाले स्वतः एव अर्थस्य अवभासक. But it is not स्वाभाविक since अनुमान also conveys the objects belonging to the past and future.

The न्यायसिद्धि commentary of प्रकरणपञ्चिका explains साक्षात्त्व in three ways.

- (i) स्वेन रूपेण वस्तुज्ञानम्. Cognition of the object in its original nature. In the case of inference the लिङ्ग does not present the object in its original nature. It presents in terms of व्याप्य and व्यापक.
- (ii) स्व विषयानन्तर्गत अर्थान्तर ज्ञानानपेक्ष स्वभावज्ञान.
- (iii) स्वकाले विद्यमान वस्तु सत्तावबोध स्वभावम् ।

The expression साक्षात् i.e. direct could be understand in three ways.

- (i) स्वरूप प्रतीति i.e. the cognition of the object concerned through its very nature but not by its capacity. Such as its being व्यापक to something that व्याप्य to it.
- (ii) अव्यवहित प्रतीति i.e. the cognition that is not dependent upon any other interveing cognition of some other object.
- (iii) The cognition that cognises an objective present when that cognition arises.

These explanations are not noticed by नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव while criticising the concept of साक्षात् प्रतीति.

इन्द्रियवादः

Here the eye etc., the five and मनस् are mentioned as इन्द्रियस. It should be noted that मनस् is considered as इन्द्रिय.

इन्द्रियस generate the knowledge of the respective objects by actual contact with the objects concerned. This is known as प्राप्यकारित्व. In the case of eye, some clarification is necessary. The eye cognises the large objects like mountain, the distant objects, and cognises the large and small objects simultaneously. If eye has to reach the objects concerned to cognise it, it will be difficult. This is answered by pointing out that the eye-rays get mixed with the sun-rays from outside and reach the large and small objects and cognise them. Thus प्राप्यकारित्व is justified in the case of eye.

मनोवैभववादः

मनस् is considered as a means to comprehend सुख etc. It is of the nature of विभु, i.e. all pervading. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, two विभु objects can have संयोग. This संयोग is not generated as in the case of the संयोग of विभु objects with the limited objects. मनस् is not only the means of the cognition of सुख, दुःख etc., even for the cognition of outside objects, मनस् is the means, through the respective इन्द्रियस.

आत्मसंयोगवादः

In this section, it is stated that though मनस् and आत्मन् are विभुस, there can be संयोग between the two. In the experiences प्राक् आकाश, उदक् आकाश, we do find the contact between आकाश and दिक्. Both there are विभुस. At

the same time we have also experiences as प्राचीनोघटः, प्रतीचीनो घटः. This means दिक् which is विभु is in contact with घट which is a limited object. Thus विभु objects can have contact, both with another विभु object and limited object.

पवनाकाशप्रत्यक्षतावादः

According to Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas वायु is प्रत्यक्ष. It is established by the syllogism वायुः प्रत्यक्षः स्पर्शवत्त्वात्. When one experience शीत उष्ण and अनुष्णाशीत स्पर्श he experiences वायुद्रव्य with these attributes. Here he does not cognise only these स्पर्शs but cognises the द्रव्य that has these स्पर्शs. This establishes प्रत्यक्षत्व of वायु.

The Bhāṭṭas consider आकाश also as प्रत्यक्ष. It is not to be inferred by शब्दगुणाश्रयत्व because शब्द is not a गुण.

कर्मप्रत्यक्षवादः

कर्म is also प्रत्यक्ष because it is cognised by इन्द्रिय. When इन्द्रियs are employed, then कर्म is cognised. When इन्द्रियs are not employed कर्म is not cognised. By this अन्वय and व्यतिरेक, प्रत्यक्षत्व of कर्म is established. It is not to be inferred by the पूर्वदेशविभाग and उत्तरदेश संयोग. These are the results of कर्म, which are also perceived.

समवायनिरासवादः

Bhāṭṭas do not accept समवाय. It is not प्रत्यक्ष as it is not

cognised by any इन्द्रिय. Moreover समवाय cannot be stated to be related with समवायिन, as it requires another समवाय to relate it. This will lead to अनवस्था.

तादात्म्यवादः

Since समवाय is rejected, some suitable relation has to be envisage between जाति and व्यक्ति. Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsakas envisaged तादात्म्य as the relation between जाति and व्यक्ति. As per this relation, the जाति and व्यक्ति, are not exclusively distinct from each other nor completely identical. This relation is of the nature of भेदाभेद. The statement अयं गौः conveys भेद between गौ and गोत्व at the same time अभेद between these two. As these are from different points of view there is no contradiction. सामाधिकरण्य of गो व्यक्ति and गोत्व जाति is the ground for अभेद. The objection that if there is अभेद between जाति and व्यक्ति, then the contingency will arise that जाति has also to be considered as अनित्य and व्यक्ति as नित्य. This objection is not correct, since both have their respective attributes in their respective capacities.

In view of this द्रव्य जाति गुण and कर्म, have तादात्म्य relation with आश्रय.

अवयविवादः

Buddhists contend that there is no अवयवि द्रव्य. What is generally considered as अवयविन्, is only the collection of

परमाणुs. It is परमाणुपुञ्ज. This is not correct, because we have the प्रत्यक्ष of अवयविन् as एको महान् घटः. It is not merely a परमाणुपुञ्ज. परमाणुs have no महत्त्व.

परमाणुवादः

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas do accept परमाणु. However, their concept of परमाणु is quite distinct from that of वैशेषिकs. When the sun rays enter through the windows, small particles are observed. These are परमाणुs. These have महत्त्व and अवयव बहुत्व, while according to the वैशेषिकs परमाणु has no महत्त्व nor अवयव बहुत्व. The process of the forming of objects through द्रुणुक and त्र्यणुक is not accepted by Mīmāṃsakas.

तमोवादः

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept तमस् as a separate द्रव्य. The objection that there is no आरंभक द्रव्य for तमस् is answered by pointing out that there are तमसपरमाणुs. Just as for the पृथ्वी etc. आरम्भक परमाणुs are envisaged. Similarly for तमस् also आरंभक परमाणुs have to be envisaged. तमस् is perceived by the eye just as other objects are perceived by the eye.

The only difference is, for perceiving other objects, आलोक सहकार is necessary while perceiving तमस् आलोक सहकार is not necessary. It may be noted here that for आलोक itself आलोक सहकार is not needed. तमस् has the qualities of रूप, सङ्ख्या etc.

जातिनिर्णयवादः

Buddhists do not accept जाति. They ridicule the concept of जाति with the remark.

न याति न च तत्रासीदस्ति पश्चान् न चांशवत् ।

जहाति पूर्वं नाधारं अहो व्यसन सन्ततिः ।

जाति is conceived as नित्य. व्यक्तिs are अनित्य. When a व्यक्ति arises, the question, as to how जाति gets connected with it. It cannot move to newly produced objects from the existing objects, because it is निष्क्रिय. It cannot be stated that जाति is already there before the newly created object and gets into that object when it is created. Further when the object is destroyed, the जाति cannot remain in it. It does not move out as it is अमूर्त. It is also not destroyed along with the object that is destroyed as it is नित्य.

In view of these contradictions Buddhist says that he is very sorry for the miserable state of जाति. The question is also raised whether the जाति remains in the व्यक्ति occupying the whole of व्यक्ति or in parts of it. These objection are answered by pointing out that जाति is everywhere manifests in a व्यक्ति that is newly created. It does not move from another व्यक्ति into newly produced व्यक्ति nor it perishes. It is only manifests when the new व्यक्ति is created and ceases to be manifested when that व्यक्ति is destroyed.

The relation between जाति and व्यक्ति is तादात्म्य. Therefore, the question whether the जाति is spread over the entire व्यक्ति or present in parts does not arise. जाति is also useful to know the meaning of words from comprehending it with reference to one word to comprehend the meaning of all words that possess the जाति of that word.

भेदवादः

In मीमांसा tradition अद्वैतिन्s are called औपनिषदः. अद्वैतिन्s reject the भेदप्रपञ्च consisting of प्रमाण and प्रमेय. They try to establish अद्वैत on the basis of certain śruti passages. They argue that भेद is of the nature of इतरेतराभाव. This cannot be cognised by प्रत्यक्ष, since, there is no contact with इन्द्रियs to अभाव. भेद also cannot be considered as पदार्थस्वरूप. In that case the statement नीलं भिन्नम्, नीलस्य भेदः etc. cannot be justified. Further, स्थंभस्य भेद सिद्धौ तत् प्रतियोगित्वेन कुम्भस्य भेद सिद्धिः । कुम्भस्य भेदसिद्धौ तत् प्रतियोगित्वेन स्थंभस्य भेदसिद्धिः इति इतरेतराश्रयः । On this claim of अद्वैतिन्, मीमांसक asks whether the भेद between स्थंभ and कुम्भ is real or not. If it is real you have agreed with us. If it is not real we ask a further question whether this भेद which does not exist is comprehended by someone at sometime or not. If it is not comprehended it cannot be denied.

अद्वैतिन् claims that अद्वैतश्रुति establishes भेदाभाव. But the very statement about it consisting of क्रियाकारकादि involves भेद.

भेद is cognised by perception. Perception is superior to that of श्रुति. Hence भेद has to be accepted.

अद्वैतवादः

अद्वैतवाद claims that ब्रह्मन् alone is real. Here the question arises whether there is any प्रमाण in this respect or not. If there is प्रमाण then, that is an additional reality. Consequently the doctrine that the ब्रह्मन् is the only reality is given up. If there is no प्रमाण then also the doctrine that ब्रह्मन् alone is real collapses. If it is claimed that the प्रमाण is मायामय, then its object will be अपरमार्थ. अद्वैतिन् argues that प्रमाण need not be परमार्थ to establish the प्रमेय concerned. For example, the syllables i.e. वर्णाs have दीर्घत्व, ह्रस्वत्व etc. forms that are not real, but still these lead to real meaning. Similarly the प्रतिबिम्ब is not real. However, it leads the knowledge of बिम्ब that is real.

In the same way unreal प्रमाण can establish अद्वितीयब्रह्मन्. This claim is not correct. In the case of बिम्ब-प्रतिबिम्ब, it is प्रतिबिम्बज्ञान that leads to बिम्बज्ञान. प्रतिबिम्बज्ञान is real. Similarly it is आरोपित ह्रस्वत्व and दीर्घत्वज्ञान that leads to अर्थज्ञान by वर्णाs. Then these are not the cases of unreal प्रमाण leading to the knowledge of the real.

विज्ञानवादः

विज्ञानवादिन्s claim that everything is विज्ञान. All objects that appear are विज्ञान. They argue that यत् प्रकाशते तत् प्रकाशद् अभिन्नम् यथा प्रदीपः प्रकाशते च नीलादि तस्मात् प्रकाशद् अभिन्नः । Further नील etc objects are always found with विज्ञान. Therefore these are identical with विज्ञान. यत् येन नित्यसहोपलभं तत् ततो न भिद्यते । नीलं ज्ञानेन नियत सहोपलम्बम् । अतः ज्ञानादभिन्नम् ।

This claim of विज्ञानवादिन्s is rejected by pointing out that the entities that are together are distinct from each other. This is clear from the fact of their togetherness. Therefore the attempt to establish अभेद of the entities that are together establishes the opposite of it.

स्वयं प्रकाशवादः

Some claim that ज्ञान is स्वप्रकाश. This is not correct. प्रकाश can enlighten the other objects. It cannot reveal itself. Those who claim that ज्ञान is स्वप्रकाश argue that when ज्ञान arises there will be no doubt about it. Therefore it is स्वयं प्रकाश.

This cannot be accepted. There is no relation between असङ्गधित्व and प्रकाशमानत्व. Further ज्ञान requires another ज्ञान for its व्यवहार. संवेदनम् स्वप्रकाशं न भवति वस्तुत्वात्. The श्रुति passages 'यत्र अयं पुरुषः स्वयं ज्योतिः' 'आत्मैवास्य ज्योतिः' etc do not convey स्वप्रकाशत्व of आत्मन्. These have to be suitably interpreted.

ज्ञानप्रत्यक्षतावादः

भाट्टमीमांसकs hold that ज्ञान is प्राकृत्यानुमेय. When an objects is revealed to us we have to infer that ज्ञान of that object has arisen in आत्मन्. Therefore ज्ञान is not प्रत्यक्ष.

प्राकट्यवादः

There are statement like घटः प्रकाशते, घटः भाति. In these statements the word प्रकाशते conveys प्राकट्य. ज्ञानं and प्रकाश i.e. प्राकट्य, are not one. In that case like घटो भाति घटो जानति could also made. ज्ञान प्रकाश पदयोः ऐकार्थे घटो भाति इति वत्, घटो जानातीति प्रयोगः स्यात् । Here an interesting point is raised. If the expression घटो भाति reveals घट. Then the statement मोदकं रोचते should reveal रुचि of मोदक.

भाते: घटसामानधिकारेण घटगतार्थत्वे रोचतेरपि मोदक सामानधिकारेण मोदक गतार्थत्वं भवेत् ।

Yes, this is not denied. However the प्राकट्य that reveals रुच्यर्थत्व of मोदक is distinct from the प्राकट्य घटः भाति.

नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव explains the procedure of प्राकट्य in respect of the objects of past and future and also objects that are not प्रत्यक्ष. प्राकट्य is considered as a kind of attribute of the object to be revealed. The process of perception is explained by Bhāttas as follows. When the eye is in contact with an object, an activity arises in the आत्मन्. This leads to the revelation of the object. The action arisen in आत्मन् is

ज्ञान and the revelation of the object is प्राकट्य. ज्ञान is not प्रत्यक्ष. It is inferred from प्राकट्य.

योगिप्रत्यक्षनिरासवादः

Some claim that योगिन्s have प्रत्यक्ष of the nature of भावनाप्रकर्ष. But it is only a kind of स्मृति. It is not प्रत्यक्ष. योगिन्s do not have special kind of प्रत्यक्ष.

अनुमान परीक्षावादः

अनुमान is defined as व्याप्यदर्शन जन्यं असन्निकृष्टार्थविषयं ज्ञानं अनुमानम्. For instance when व्याप्य धूम is cognised, then there will be वह्नि ज्ञान while धूम is actually seen वह्नि is not seen. This वह्नि is not इन्द्रियसन्निकृष्ट. The व्याप्ति is explained as साध्येन साधनस्य निरुपाधिकः अन्वयः । i.e. the association of साधन with साध्य without any condition.

निरुपाधिकत्व of the association of साधन and साध्य has to be ascertained by भूयोदर्शन and तर्क.

अनुमान is of two types viz., दृष्ट and सामान्यतो दृष्ट. The inference of an object, from another known object is दृष्ट. For example स्वरेण पुत्रानुमानम्. स्वर the voice of the son is known. From this it is inferred that the person who is speaking is his son. सामान्यतो दृष्ट is an inference that is based on सामान्य. For example the inference of वह्नि from धूम is सामान्यतो दृष्ट inference. The inference is further classified as स्वार्थ and परार्थ. For the statement of परार्थ the

न्यायवैशेषिकs work out five steps viz. प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु, उदाहरण, उपनयन and निगमन. However मीमांसकs take the stand that only three steps are sufficient i.e., प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and दृष्टान्त. नीतितत्त्वाविर्भाव works out हेत्वाभासs in detail.

शाब्दपरीक्षावादः

शाब्द is defined as विज्ञातेभ्यः पदेभ्यः पदार्थस्मृतिमुखेन असन्निकृष्टे अर्थे यत् ज्ञानम् तत् शाब्दम् ।

Verbal cognition is that which is produced by words through their meanings about an object, not known by any other प्रमाण. Here पदार्थ has to be taken as remembered according to Chidananda i.e., स्मृति. But according to Parthasarathy it is taken as conveyed by denotative power i.e. अभिहित. The शब्द is of two types पौरुषेय and अपौरुषेय. It is argued that पौरुषेय शब्द cannot be प्रमाण because these are affected by the suspicion of drawbacks, such as (1) the very speaker's ignorance about the fact stated by him (2) deliberately misleading (3) grammatical and syntactical errors and (4) logical errors in the statement. In view of the possibilities of these errors पौरुषेय statements cannot be considered as valid.

Infact the पौरुषेय statement does not convey its meaning, in the very first instance. Speaker's knowledge has to be inferred by his statement. If his knowledge is free from the above drawbacks then only the statement will be valid.

ननु कथं पौरुषेयं शाब्दं पुरुषवचसां वक्तृभिप्रायानुमापकत्वात् । नहि तानि अर्थे प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हन्ति, शङ्काकुण्ठित शङ्कित्वात् ।

This contention is not correct. As in the case of the knowledge obtained by the senses, doubts of the drawbacks are removed by checking the absence of the same. Similarly in the case of पौरुषेय statements also doubt about the drawbacks can be removed by appropriate verification.

इन्द्रियादेरिव शङ्कितव्यभिचारादपि वाक्यात् वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः प्रथमुप-
जनितेव पश्चात् व्यभिचारनिदानभूत भ्रमादि चतुष्टयाभाव निश्चयात्
प्रमाणमिति निश्चियते ।

Further if लौकिकवाक्य does not convey any meaning then there cannot be any प्रवृत्ति even after hearing the statement of a reliable person.

Though in the case of अनाप्तकवाक्य the drawbacks are found, since, the vedas are not statements of अनाप्त there is no ground to suspect any drawback in the case of vedic statements. Vedic statements are not the statement of आप्त or अनाप्त as these are अपौरुषेय.

उपमानपरीक्षावादः

Śabarabhāṣya explains the nature of उपमान as the perception of similarity in an object produces the cognition of similarity in its correlate that it is not in contact with the sense of the observers. For instance, the

perception of similarity in the forest cow i.e. (gavaya) produces the cognition of similarity in the village cow seen earlier and now remembered. The process of this cognition is explained as under : a person goes to the forest and happens to see a forest cow i.e. (gavaya) which is similar to the village cow. He remembers the village cow and cognises the fact that the village cow is similar to the forest cow. In this process the perception of similarity of the village cow in the forest cow is the means and cognition of similarity of the forest cow in the village cow is the result. It is the case of perception of similarity in one correlate i.e. प्रतियोगिन् producing cognition of similarity in the other correlate i.e. प्रतियोग्यान्तर.

The cognition of similarity in the forest cow is of the nature of perception, since the forest cow is actually perceived. However the cognition of the similarity in the village cow cannot be considered as perception since the cow is presently not in contact with the observers eye. The cow is remembered. But the similarity with the forest cow cannot also be considered as remembered since it was not experienced earlier. The observer of the cow was not aware of the similarity with the forest cow as he had not yet seen the latter. Therefore the cognition of similarity is not a case of memory. It also cannot be considered as inferred.

Those who try to include उपमान under the inference formulate the syllogism as the village cow has

similarity with the forest cow, because the latter has similarity with it. This is a maxim or a general rule but not व्याप्ति relation between the two similarities or similar objects. Similarity is dual. The similarities found in the two correlates are not found in one together. Therefore one cannot be the हेतु to infer the other.

Since the cognition of similarity cannot be classified as perception, memory or inference, a new प्रमाण is conceived. As this new प्रमाण is based on similarity it is designated as उपमान.

The न्याय explains the nature and purpose of उपमान differently. A forest dweller informs a villager that the forest cow is similar to village low and it is called गवय. The villager when he visits the forest happens to see the forest cow that is similar to the village cow and understands that this forest cow is called गवय. The knowledge of the import of the statement of the forest dweller is the means and the comprehension that the forest cow is called गवय is the result.

The earlier न्यायिकs consider the knowledge of the statement is the means as stated above and the later न्यायिकs consider perception of similarity in the forest cow is the means. In either case similarity is the basis of comprehension of the relation between the name गवय and the forest cow. Therefore, this cognition is called उपमान.

In न्याय tradition the means is called उपमान and the result is called उपमिति.

On a careful analysis of the above procedure it will be found that it does not make any room for a new प्रमाण. The statement that a forest cow is similar to village cow gives only the meaning of the word गवय indicating its special nature. The listner has to await for actual observation of such an animal to comprehend the meaning of this word. When he actually perceives the animal, he comprehends the meaning of the word गवय.

On seeing गवय he remembers the statement and comprehends that the object perceived by him is conveyed by the word गवय. Thus the relation between the word गवय and the object गवय is comprehended from the statements i.e. शब्दप्रमाण aided by the perception of the object.

Hence there is no need of envisaging any new प्रमाण for this purpose. It is already stated above that the मीमांसा concept of उपमान cannot be included under अनुमान or प्रत्यक्ष.

मानमेयोदय raises an objection that if on the basis of similarity a new प्रमाण is envisaged, why not think of a new प्रमाण on the basis of dissimilarity. It answers that dissimilarity is negative and it cannot be cognised by अनुपलब्धिप्रमाण.

A later नैयायिक expands the scope of उपमान and says that the relation between the word and the meaning can be comprehended on the basis of dis similarity also.

For मीमांसक, उपमानप्रमाण serves a practical purpose in organising the sacrifice in two respects. (1) Details of आग्नेय sacrifice are borrowed to सौर्य sacrifice on the ground that these have common deity and are similar in this respect.

When व्रीहि grains are not available for preparing पुरोडाश, नीवार grains may be used for the purpose since these are similar in nature.

The Prābhākaras also explain the nature and role of उपमान in the same way. However, they consider similarity as separate category while Bhāttas consider it as an assemblage of common attributes in the two that correlates.

अर्थापत्तिपरीक्षा

The concept of अर्थापत्ति is the special contribution of पूर्वमीमांस. It is primarily formulated to establish the concept of अपूर्व which is very vital to पूर्वमीमांस. शक्ति is also established by अर्थापत्ति. शबरभाष्य explains the nature of अर्थापत्ति as अर्थापत्तिरपि दृष्टः श्रुतोवा अर्थः अन्यथा न उपपद्यते इति अर्थकल्पना.

Postulating another fact when a fact that is seen or

heard is found incompatible in the absence of such a postulation is अर्थापत्ति. For instance on finding that देवदत्त who is known to be alive is not found in his residence. It has to be postulated that is outside. This is अर्थापत्ति.

अर्थापत्ति has two important aspects viz. (i) identifying incompatibility i.e. अनुपपत्ति between two known facts and postulating a third fact, i.e. उपपादक कल्पना to resolve the incompatibility.

In the stock example the fact that देवदत्त being alive but not found at residence are incompatible. This incompatibility is resolved by postulating his presence outside.

अर्थापत्ति cannot be included under अनुमान. The न्याय does not accept अर्थापत्ति as a separate प्रमाण. It is included under अनुमान. The stock example is put in the form of a syllogism as under : देवदत्त is outside his residence, because he is alive, and not available at his residence. However on closer examination, it will be found that this syllogism does not serve any purpose. The हेतु given here has two clauses viz., देवदत्त is alive and is not found at his residence. The first clause clearly implies that देवदत्त must be in some place, since he is alive. This place is naturally other than his residence. Therefore the conclusion to be drawn by the inference is already known at the हेतु stage only. The two clauses of हेतु will

remain incompatible with the presence of देवदत्त outside the house is not envisaged. In view of this अर्थापत्ति cannot be included under अनुमान.

अभावपरीक्षा

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept a sixth प्रमाण viz., अनुपलब्धे or अभाव for the cognition of negation. Its nature is explained in शबरभाष्य as अभावोपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्ति इति अर्थस्य असन्निकृष्टस्य. The non-cognition by the five प्रमाणs is a means of cognition of negation i.e. represented as नास्ति i.e. is not. The cognition that here is no jar on the ground is the cognition of the negation of jar. The entity represented by the know is negation. The ground is its location. However it is different from the ground. The jar is the counter-entity of this negation. The counter-entity which is capable of being cognized is not cognised on the ground. This very main cognition of jar is the means of the cognition of its substance. Here both the means and the result are of native type.

However the न्याय argues that the negation can be cognised by प्रत्यक्ष. Though there is no contact between the sense and negation there is a contact between the locus of the negation and sense. The eye is in contact with ground. The absence of jar is an attribute of the ground. It has the relation of विशेषणतः. This is sufficient to establish the contact between the two. But this argument is not sound. To be an attribute some positive relation is

a necessity. Negation is negative in its nature and therefore it cannot have a positive relation. Hence it cannot be considered as an attribute in the strict sense of the term.

The Prābhākaraś do not accept the category of अभाव. Consequently they do not accept अभाव प्रमाण also. To under Prābhākaraś stand that, the अभाव is not a separate category their concept of संसृष्टविषयबुद्धि and एकविषयबुद्धि have to be understood. When two positive are cognised together, it is संसृष्टविषय बुद्धि while cognising only one of them is एकविषयबुद्धि. The later serves the purpose of अभाव.

For instance, when one cognises a jar on the ground, it is संसृष्टविषयबुद्धि since two objects viz., ground and jar are cognised. When the jar is removed, he cognises the ground only. This is एक विषयबुद्धि. The absence of jar is not a separate object.

आत्मवादः

In this section it is pointed out that आत्मन् is distinct from शरीर, इन्द्रिय and मनस्. Even ज्ञान is not आत्मन् because आत्मन् is ज्ञाता. There cannot be any identity between ज्ञाता and ज्ञान. आत्मन्s are many and are distinct from one another. जीवात्मन् is distinct from Brahman. आत्मन् undergoes सुख, दुःख etc. during संसार stage.

In the liberated stage there will be no दुःख and आत्मन्'s आनन्द nature will manifest. The concept of आत्मैक्य is rejected. If आत्मैक्य is accepted then, when one is released, all will have to be released. The श्रुति passages “एक एव च भूतात्मा भूते भूते व्यवस्थितः” “एको देवः सर्वभूतेषु गूढः” etc are अर्थवादs.

अन्विताभिधानवादः

Prābhākaras advocate अन्विताभिधान theory of sentence meaning. According to this theory कार्य – the meaning of the injunctive suffix is the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence. The meanings of all other words get connected with it. आकाङ्क्षा, योग्यता, सन्निधि are the aids for the formation of a sentence.

In support of this theory, they quote the very process of learning the language. The eldest person asks गां आनय. The elder person brings the cow. The boy standing nearby observes the statement and the action. He comprehends the meaning of the sentence गां आनय and comes to know that the गौ is connected with the action आनयन. Thus his understanding is कार्यान्वित type. On this basis Prābhākaras claim that कार्यान्विते व्युत्पत्तिः. This is not acceptable to Bhāttas. Bhāttas point out that गो पदार्थ needs आनयपदार्थ to get connected with it. आनयपदार्थ needs गो पदार्थ. This leads to अन्योन्याश्रय. Further, a word occurs in several sentences. It has to get connected with a meaning of the words in all those sentences. This means आनन्त्य.

Rejecting अन्विभिदान on these ground, Bhāttas advocate अभिहितान्वय theory. According to this theory words convey their meanings and these lead to sentence meaning by लक्षणा. तात्पर्यानुपपत्ति is the ground for this लक्षणा.

वेदापौरुषेयवादः

Those who oppose the अपौरुषेयत्व of Vedas formulate the following syllogism in support of पौरुषेयत्व of vedas. वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयानि वाक्यत्वात्. They also point out that the वर्णाः are duly arranged for a word. And the words are duly arranged for a sentence. This kind of arrangement involves पुरुष प्रयत्न. Therefore vedas are पौरुषेय.

This contention cannot be accepted. If वेदाः, were composed by some persons, their names would have been remembered as in the case of Rāmāyaṇa and Bhārata. Very learned people perform ज्योतिष्टोम etc. sacrifices that require a lot of effort to accomplish. These are described in Vedas. If Vedas were composed by some persons, these persons certainly would have been remembered. Since the so-called authors are not remembered. We have to conclude that there are no authors for the Vedas.

The statements ऋग्वेद एव अग्नेः अजायत

the Yajurveda from Vāyu, Sāmavedas from आदित्यs etc. have to be taken as अर्थवादः.

तन्त्रहस्यम्

Introduction

The author of तन्त्रहस्य viz. Dharmapuri Rāmānujāchārya belongs about 1750 A.D. In the Introductory Verses to तन्त्रहस्य he informs that he hails from Dharmapuri, on the banks of Godāvāri. He mentions the temple of Navasimha of that place and pays respects to Navasimha as one of the forms of विष्णु. At the commencement of शास्त्रारम्भ परिच्छेद he informs that his guru is Venkatadri, an expert in श्रीभाष्य of Śrī Rāmānujāchārya. Pandit K.S. Ramaswamy in his detailed introduction to the second edition traces the origin and development of Prābhākara school. He also mentions जातवेदगुरु as a great scholar at the commencement of शास्त्रप्रमेयपरिच्छेद. Dharmapuri mentioned is different from Dharmapuri of Tamilnadu.

This was a great centre of Dvaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita scholars during 16th to 18th Century. This was a centre of Dvaita Tradition saints also. In विद्यादीशविजय this town is mentioned and श्री विद्यधीश used to go to this place frequently.

तन्त्रहस्य is a manual of Prābhākara school of मीमांसा. It is much later than मानमेयोदय of Nārāyaṇa which is a manual of Bhāṭṭa School of पूर्वमीमांसा. प्रमाण and प्रमेय of the respective school are stated in both the works.

However the presentation of शाब्दप्रमाण is in greater detail in तन्त्रहस्य than मानमेयोदय. शास्त्रारम्भसमर्थन is also discussed in detail.

प्रमाण परिच्छेद

Under this chapter the general definition of प्रमाण as अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम् is given.

It is stated that this excludes स्मृति from the scope of प्रमाण. Prābhākaras claim that all cognitions are valid. यथार्थ सर्व विज्ञानम्. They include the instances of संशय स्वप्न etc. also under यथार्थज्ञान by appropriate explanations. The statement इदं रजतम् conveys two cognitions. इदं refers to the अनुभव of शुक्ति, in a general way without reference to its special features. रजतम् refers to रजत remembered. However the distinction between शुक्तिग्रहण and रजतस्मरण is not realised as these two occur very quickly, one after the other. Both these cognitions are true, as the objects referred to by them, are actually present. The presentation of the objects in the cognition is technically called भासमान. The objects referred to are called वेद्य. These two should agree, to make a cognition यथार्थ. In the case of इदं रजतम् what is presented in अनुभव and स्मरण actually agree with the facts.

Therefore both these cognitions are true and distinct. However the distinctions of these is not realised.

Because of this the statement इदं रजतम् does not lead to समर्थप्रवृत्ति.

In the instance of doubt viz. स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषो वा, the observer observes a pole and remembers स्थाणु and पुरुष. However he is not able to identify the pole, either as स्थाणु or as पुरुष. But his स्मरण of स्थाणु and पुरुष are true. It is only his inability to identify the pole with one of them that leads to the doubt. But the two cognitions involved in it are true.

In the instance of पीतः शङ्खः the पित्तद्रव्य present in the eye is projected on शङ्ख. Therefore शङ्ख is taken as yellow. Here also पित्तद्रव्य is true and शङ्ख is also true. Therefore the cognition that पीतः शङ्ख is true. In this way Prābhākara's explain all experiences to be यथार्थ. यथार्थं सर्वं विज्ञानम् is an important doctrine of प्रभाकरा's.

After discussing the यथार्थ of all cognitions तन्त्ररहस्य (TR) takes up Kumāriḷa Bhatta's definition of प्रमाण viz. दृढं अविस्वादि अगृहीत ग्राहि विज्ञानं प्रमाणम् for discussion.

This definition is reviewed clause by clause and rejected. The problem of प्रामाण्य स्वतस्त्वं envisaged by Bhāttas is discussed in detail.

The five प्रमाणाः viz. प्रत्यक्ष, अनुमान, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति and शब्द are stated. प्रत्यक्ष is defined as साक्षात् पतीति: प्रत्यक्षम्. The expression साक्षात् means the direct cognition of the

very स्वरूप of the object. In the case of inference the object is cognised in its capacity as व्यापक while in the case of प्रत्यक्ष the object is cognised as it is. This is the implication of साक्षात्.

In respect of अनुमान the nature of व्याप्ति and steps of परार्थानुमान and all other details of अनुमान are discussed.

The Prābhākara's explanation of उपमान is quiet different from that of न्यायवैशेषिक's. By observing a सदृश object, comprehending सादृश्य in other object which is सदृश to it is उपमान. सदृश दर्शनात् तत् सदृश वस्त्वन्तर्गत सादृश्यज्ञानम् उपमानम् ।

When a person who has seen a cow in the village sees a forest-cow in the forest, by observing the सादृश्य in the forest cow he gets the knowledge of सादृश्य in the village-cow. This सादृश्यज्ञान is उपमान. उपमान cannot be included in अनुमान.

अर्थापत्ति प्रमाण is a distinct contribution of पूर्वमीमांसा. When two known facts become incompatible unless a relevant other object is envisaged the envisaging of the concerned other object is अर्थापत्ति. For example Devadatta is known to be alive but is absent at home, to resolve this conflict his presence out side has to be envisaged. This is अर्थापत्ति.

Prābhākara's do not accept the category of अभाव. Consequently they do not accept अभाव प्रमाण. They explain the situation of अभाव as follows. When there is a book on the table it is संसृष्ट विषयक बुद्धि of table and book. When there is no book on the table, then it एकविषयकबुद्धि of the table. अभाववादिन्s claim this एकविषयकबुद्धि position as अभाव. There is no need of envisaging the category अभाव here.

प्रमेय परिच्छेद

Prābhākaras accept eight categories viz. द्रव्य, गुण, कर्म, सामान्य, समवाय, शक्ति, सङ्ख्या, सादृश्य. Among these the first five are common with न्यायवैशेषिकाs. Under द्रव्य, nine द्रव्याs are listed which are also common with न्यायवैशेषिकाs. It should be noted that तमस् accepted by Bhāttas is not accepted by Prābhākaras. शब्द is accepted as द्रव्य by Bhāttas but it is considered as Guṇa by Prābhākaras. सामान्य or जाति is stated to be distinct from व्यक्ति and it is perceived only in प्रत्यक्ष द्रव्यs. Bhāttas consider जाति as भिन्नाभिन्न with व्यक्ति.

The category विशेष accepted by न्यायवैशेषिकाs is not accepted by Prābhākaras.

The relation between अयुतसिद्धाs is समवाय. It arises along with the very object which is to be related by it with the cause. It is not प्रत्यक्ष. It has to be only inferred.

- i. अयुतसिद्धयोः सम्बन्धः समवायः
- ii. यतः कार्यमुत्पद्यते तदैव तदुत्पत्तिः

शक्ति is present in all भावपदार्थाs. It is to be inferred from its effect. For instance the fire normally burns but when it is prevented by मणि, मन्त्र, औषधि, then it does not burn. Therefore we have to envisage the शक्ति i.e. in that is prevented by मणि मन्त्र and औषधि.

साङ्ख्या is a separate पदार्थ as it cannot be included under द्रव्य, गुण etc. सादृश्य is also a separate पदार्थ.

शास्त्रपरिच्छेदः

The word शास्त्र refers to वेदरूपशब्दप्रमाण. Tantra Rahasya explains it as सम्बन्धग्रहणवशेन अर्थप्रत्यायकं पदजातं.

A group of words that convey the meaning on the basis of the comprehension of the relation between the word and the meaning. It is also explained as प्रत्यक्षाद्यसन्निकृष्टार्थम् शास्त्रम्, शास्त्र is that which conveys the objects that are not conveyed by प्रत्यक्ष etc other प्रमाणाs. The relation between the words and meaning is natural and eternal. This is stated in the जैमिनि सूत्र – औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्य अर्थेन सम्बन्धः. The वर्णाs are नित्य and विभु. अर्थ is also प्रवाहतो नित्य. Therefore the relation between the two is नित्य.

Here a question is raised whether the वर्णाs are produced or manifested. Those who hold the view that these are produced argue as follows :

(A)(i) The different speakers pronounce क ग etc. वर्णाs differently. Therefore these are produced.

(ii) वर्णः ध्वस्तः, वर्णः उत्पन्नः state that वर्णाs are produced, and वर्णाs perish. This indicate that वर्णाs are produced.

(iii) If वर्णाs are manifested then by one effort of manifestation all वर्णाs should have been manifested.

(B) This is not acceptable to those who hold the view that वर्णाs are manifested.

By the efforts of vocal organs तालु, ओष्ठ etc. वर्णाs are manifested but not produced, we have the experience as स एवार्थ गकारः. This is प्रत्यभिज्ञा. This establishes नित्यत्व of वर्ण. These are manifested but not produced.

The relation between the word and the meaning is comprehended through वृद्धव्यवहार. The present generation of elders learnt it from the previous generation of elders.

They will have also learnt it from the elders of previous generation. In this way वृद्धव्यवहार is अनादि. Therefore the relation between the word and the meaning is also अनादि. In this context a point is raised that, at the time of प्रलय all are simultaneously withdrawn. At the creation, the सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्ति. God creates the objects and the persons. He fixes the relationship between the words and their meaning. Therefore this relation is not अनादि but it is fixed by God.

This theory is not valid. All the objects and persons are not simultaneously destroyed at the time of प्रलय. Therefore the question of सर्वज्ञ and सर्वशक्ति God, creating these and fixing the relation between the words and the meaning does not arise.

Before presenting Prābhākara view of अन्विताभिदानवाद. TR presents the views of व्याकरण viz. स्फोट and rejects it.

प्रत्यस्थमित वर्ण विभागं पदवाक्य शब्दवाच्यं स्फोटारख्यं शब्दं प्राहुः. This is rejected by pointing out that there is no such thing as पद over and above the वर्णाs. Therefore the idea of स्फोट has no basis. नानावर्ण व्यतिरेकेण निर्भाग शब्दतत्त्वानुपलम्भात्. Then TR states the भाट्ट view that the पदs convey पदार्थs. These lead to वाक्यार्थ by लक्षण. आकाङ्क्ष, योग्यता and सन्निधि are the aids for it.

Finally TR presents the Prābhākara view as पदानि एव वाक्यम् । पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः । तत्र पदान्येव प्रमाणम् । अर्थान्तरान्वित स्वार्थे पदानां व्युत्पत्तेः ।

After rejecting the arguments against अन्विताभिदानवाद TR discusses वक्त्रभिप्राय अनुमेयत्व of लौकिक statements. TR concludes this discussion with the remark. तस्मात् लौकिक-वाक्यं लिङ्गतयैव प्रमाणम् । लौकिकं तु वाक्यम् न शास्त्रम् । किन्तु लिङ्गम् ।

TR neatly puts the topics discussed under this chapter as follows :

वर्णाः नित्याः । अर्थाश्च प्रवाह रूपेण । तत् सम्बन्धः अपौरुषेयः । तत् परिज्ञानं शक्तिग्रहात् । शक्तिग्रहश्च वृद्धव्यवहारेण । स च कार्यान्वित स्वार्थे । तत्र पदान्येव कार्यान्वित स्वार्थबोधकानि । लौकिकं पदं अनुमानरूपम्, न शास्त्रम् ।

शास्त्रप्रमेयपरिचयः

कार्य which is also called अपूर्व because it is not conveyed by any other प्रमाण other than vedic injunctions. The entire शास्त्र conveys कार्य only.

Kumārila Bhatta explains the meaning of लिङ् differently. लिङ् has two aspects. लिङ्त्व and आख्यातत्त्व. लिङ्त्व aspects conveys शाब्दिभावना and आख्यातत्त्व aspects convey आर्थाभावना. These two constitute the import of injunctive suffix.

Mandana Misra holds the view that इष्टसाधनत्व is the import of injunctive suffix. Quoting the view of a few others TR states the Prābhākara view. According to Prābhākara's कार्य is the import of लिङ्. This कार्य elicits a नियोज्य and विषय. याग is both विषय and करण. लिङ् also conveys कृति i.e. भावना. This भावना is different from the शाब्दीभावना and आर्थाभावना envisaged by Bhāttas. Achieving अपूर्व itself is the end of implementing the कार्य. स्वर्ग is a secondary result. All auxiliaries also get connected with कार्य through याग, लिङ्प्रत्ययः युगपत् कृत्स्न पदार्थान्वितं स्वार्थं अभिधत्ते । स च अन्वयः ग्रहकैदमर्त्य रूपः । इदं च ग्राहकग्रहणं खलेकपोतवत् अन्योन्यान्वितैः कृत्स्न पदार्थैः युगपदेव भवति ।

शास्त्रारम्भपरिच्छेदः

To determine the correct import of Veda पूर्वमीमांसा is an aid.

धर्मे प्रमेयमानेहि वेदेन करणात्मना ।

इति कर्तव्यताभागं मीमांसा पूरयिष्यति ॥

In view of this whether the study of मीमांसाशास्त्र be undertaken or not is discussed in मीमांसा works. In TR this problem is discussed in this chapter.

वेदवाक्यार्थं संशये सति तन् निर्णयौपेत न्याय निबन्धन शास्त्रं मीमांसा ।

संप्रति तदारम्भो विचार्यते । तत्र पूर्वपक्ष संक्षेपः । किं मीमांसा आरम्भणीया उत न इति प्रथम विचारः । तदर्थं स्वाध्यायः विवक्षितार्थः उत न । तदर्थमपि किं स्वाध्यायो अध्येतव्यः इति विधेः अर्थज्ञानं भाव्यं उत स्वर्गादि फलमिति ।

TR presents पूर्वपक्ष and सिद्धान्त of this topic, both according to Bhāttas and Prābhākaras.

According to Bhāttas पूर्वपक्षिन् argues that अर्थज्ञान is not a भाव्य for this injunction, because अर्थज्ञान can be obtained in a natural way without any injunction. It cannot be considered as नियमविधि, अध्ययनेनैव अर्थज्ञानं संपादयेत्, because there is no क्रतुसंस्पर्श, that is to say, that this injunction is not connected with any sacrifice. Hence no अर्थज्ञान is necessary. Consequently मीमांसा or विचार need not be undertaken.

सिद्धान्तिन् points out that अर्थज्ञान is necessary for कर्मानुष्ठान and through कर्मानुष्ठान it is connected with क्रतु. Hence by नियमविधि, अर्थज्ञान has to be obtained by अध्ययन only, but not by any other means.

From Prābhākara point of view TR states the पूर्वपक्ष and सिद्धान्त as follows. स्वाध्याय अध्ययन is अध्यापन विधिप्रयुक्त. Therefore its प्रयोजन is आचार्यकर्तृ संपादन but not अर्थज्ञान. Hence undertaking मीमांसाविचार is not necessary.

पूर्वपक्ष— अध्यापनविधि प्रयुक्तस्य, स्वाध्यायाध्ययनस्य प्रयोजनापेक्षायां पुरुषान्तरगामित्वेन बहिरङ्गमपि प्रथमावगतत्वेन अध्यापन प्रयोजनं आचार्यकमेव न तु अर्थज्ञानम् ।

Then सिद्धान्तिन् points out that आचार्य कर्तृ is बहिरङ्ग while अर्थज्ञान is अन्तरङ्ग. Therefore both are प्रयोजनस. There is no clash between the two प्रयोजनस, one is शाब्द, the other is आर्थ. Since अर्थज्ञान is considered as प्रयोजन, मीमांसा i.e. विचार has to undertaken.

i) यद्यपि प्रयोजकविध्यधिकारः पूर्वभावी तथापि न तत्सिद्धिरेव प्रयोजनं बहिरङ्गत्वात् । किन्तु कर्तृगामित्वात् अन्तरङ्गत्वात् अर्थज्ञानं प्रयोजनत्वेन स्वीक्रियते ।

ii) ननु एकस्मिन् विषये प्रयोजनद्वयं विरुद्धं इति चेत् न । एकस्य शाब्दत्वात् इतरस्य आर्थत्वात् ।

मीमांसाभाष्यपरिशिष्टम्

शालिकनाथ the author of this brief work is a leading personality in the Prābhākara school. He has written two detailed commentaries viz. ऋजुविमल and दीपिशिख on बृहति and लघ्वी of Prābhākara which are the commentaries on शाबरभाष्य.

His प्रकरणपञ्चिका is a standard work of Prābhākara school. His date is fixed as 690-760 A.D.

भाष्यपरिशिष्ट is a brief commentary on the तर्कपाद of शाबरभाष्य discussing the import of the first सूत्र viz. अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा. He works out आरम्भणीयत्व of मीमांसाशास्त्र. वेदाध्ययन has to be undertaken as a result of अध्यापनविधि. Then there will be अर्थज्ञान. To the वेदार्थ deeply and correctly, मीमांसा श्रवण is necessary.

अध्यापनविधि प्रयुक्त्या अधीतवेदात् अर्थावगमः । वेदार्थ जिज्ञास एव मीमांसाश्रवणेः प्रवृत्तिः । वेदाध्ययन मीमांसाश्रवणयोः मध्ये अधिकारः इति मीमांसक प्रसिद्धिः ।

Discussing the import of सूत्र, चोदना लक्षणः अर्थः धर्मः. He rises the question of प्रामाण्य and अप्रामाण्य. He presents the views of the different schools of Indian philosophy. Finally he presents the पूर्वमीमांस view स्वतः सर्वज्ञानानाम् प्रामाण्यं, अप्रामाण्यं तु परतः. According to Prābhākara's वेद conveys कार्य. This is stated in चोदना सूत्र. चोदनासूत्रेण तु कथं अर्थं वेदस्य प्रामाण्यम् इति प्रतिपदितम् । अथातो

धर्मजिज्ञास इत्यनेन शास्त्रस्य शास्त्रारम्भणीयत्वम् साधितम् । Then he proceeds to प्रत्यक्ष सूत्र and gives the details of the procedure of शब्द and अर्थ is stated to be natural and permanent.

Before proceeding to establish नित्यत्व of शब्द to sustain नित्यत्वात् of शब्दार्थसम्बन्ध he discusses वृत्तिकारा's view quoted in the भाष्य itself. वृत्तिकारा's presentation of शून्यवाद and its refutation are briefly summarised. Then he briefly presents अनुमान प्रमाण, उपमान, अर्थापत्ति and अभाव. The purpose of stating these प्रमाणा's is only to show that these are not useful to comprehend the धर्म's described in the वेदा's. He rejects the category of अभाव and अभाव प्रमाण. Then he takes the question of the nature of शब्द.

He rejects the view that there is a पद over and above वर्णा's and summarises the भाष्य as भाष्यार्थस्तु पूर्ववर्णजनित संस्कार सहितः अन्यः वर्णः प्रत्यापकः । The arguments stated in सूत्रा's against शब्दनित्यत्व are stated viz. “कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्” “करोति शब्दात्,” “यौग पध्यात्” etc. and refutes. The सिद्धान्तसूत्रा's such as सर्वत्र यौगपध्यात् सङ्ख्या भावात् etc are also quoted and explained.

After establishing नित्यत्वात्, शब्द अर्थ and laying the foundation for वेदापौरुषेयत्व it is the question of वाक्य. Under the सूत्र उत्पत्तौ च अवचना स्युः अर्थस्य अतन्यमित्वात् । पूर्वपक्ष position is stated. Though शब्द, अर्थ and their सम्बन्ध

are अपौरुषेय, mere words cannot convey the import of चोदना viz. धर्म. In सिद्धान्तसूत्र viz. तद्भूतानां क्रियर्थेन समाम्नायः अर्थस्य तनूनिमित्तत्वात् informs that the words are employed for conveying कार्य. Therefore these get connected to accomplish this purpose and form a sentence. यानि पदानि येषु अर्थेषु वृद्ध व्यवहारे दृष्टानि तेषां पदानां तेषु एव अर्थेषु वर्तमानानां तद् व्यवहार क्रियार्थेन समुच्चारणं एक वाक्यतया प्रयोगः लोके वेदे च. In view of this no intervention of persons to formulate a sentence is necessary. After establishing अपौरुषेयत्व of वेदा's at वाक्य level also. Certain minor objections against वेदापौरुषेयत्व viz. the names of certain persons such as प्रावाहनि are mentioned. The names of certain seers are connected with different शाखा's are mentioned. This indicates पौरुषेयत्व. This objection is rejected by pointing out that the seers stated for different शाखा's are the teachers of those शाखा's but not the author.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi

विषयानुक्रमणिका

विषयः	पृष्ठम्	विषयः	पृष्ठम्
कार्यवादः	12	अविद्यावादः	92
स्वतः प्रामाण्यवादः	25	मिथ्यावादः	94
कालप्रत्यक्षतावादः	34	विज्ञानवादः	96
अन्यथाख्यातिवादः	38	स्वयंप्रकाशवादः	102
साक्षात्प्रतीतिनिरासवादः	44	ज्ञानप्रत्यक्षतावादः	106
कल्पनापोढनिरासवादः	46	प्राकट्यवादः	107
योगरूढिवादः	25	योगिप्रत्यक्षनिरासवादः	110
इन्द्रियवादः	50	अथानुमानम्	
मनोवैभववादः	50	अनुमानपरीक्षावादः	111
अजसंयोगवादः	54	शाब्दम्	
पवनाकाशप्रत्यक्षतावादः	55	शाब्दपरीक्षावादः	116
कर्मप्रत्यक्षतावादः	57	अथोपमानम्	
विशेषनिराकरणवादः	62	अथ उपमानपरीक्षावादः	121
समवायनिरासवादः	62	अथार्थापत्तिः	
तादात्म्यवादः	65	अर्थापत्तिपरीक्षावादः	126
अवयववादः	70	अथाभावः	166
परमाणुवादः	72	स्फोटवादः	146
तमोवादः	73	ईश्वरवादः	147
जातिनिर्णयवादः	75	शब्दनित्यत्ववादः	157
महासामान्यवादः	79	क्षणिकवादः	163
अवान्तरजातिवादः	81	आत्मवादः	172
भेदवादः	82	अन्विताभिधानवादः	181
अद्वैतवादः	89	वेदापौरुषेयवादः	190
अनिर्वचनीयवादः	89		

चिदानन्दपण्डितप्रणीतः

नीतितत्त्वाविर्भावः

प्रत्यक्षपरीक्षा

वन्दे कल्याणयोरेकमिन्दुचूडमुकुन्दयोः ।
 अङ्गं कलिन्दहिमवत्सुतयोरिव सङ्गमम् ॥
 आचार्यकृतिप्रकृतेराविर्भावाय नीतितत्त्वानाम् ।
 अयमिह यत्नः क्रियते सन्तः पुष्यन्तु सन्तोषम् ॥
 विदुषामयं प्रबन्धो दुर्जनदूष्योऽपि जायते प्रीत्यै ।
 किं शर्करा न मधुरा पित्तोपहतस्य तिक्तेति ॥
 आदौ स्वाध्यायविध्यर्थनिर्णयाय यतामहे ।
 शास्त्रारम्भस्य वैधत्वप्रतिपादनसिद्धये ॥

यदि हि “स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य” इति विधिः अध्ययनस्य स्वाध्याय-
 संस्कारद्वारेणार्थज्ञानसाधनत्वं बोधयतीति न प्रतिपद्येत, तर्ह्यर्थज्ञानानुष्ठानस्य
 वैधत्ववैधुर्यात्तदङ्गभूतं मीमांसाश्रवणमपि न वैधं स्यात्, अवैधश्च न वैधं
 स्नानमुत्क्रष्टुमर्हति, इति नाध्ययनानन्तरं तद्धेतुका धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्या
 भवेत् । अतो मीमांसाश्रवणस्य वैधत्वप्रतिपादनाय स्वाध्यायाध्ययनविधिः
 अधीतेन स्वाध्यायेनार्थज्ञानं सम्पाद्यमिति बोधयति न वेति चिन्त्यते ।

तत्र “स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्य” इति तव्यप्रत्ययावगता विध्यवरुद्धा भावना
 समानपदोपात्तमध्ययनमपुरुषार्थत्वादुल्लङ्घ्य पुरुषार्थरूपं भाव्यमाकाङ्क्षमाणा
 समनन्तरपदोपात्तं स्वाध्यायमपि तत एव भाव्यतया नाभिलषति । न च
 स्वाध्ययस्य संस्कार्यतया भाव्यत्वं, भूतभाव्युपयोगरहितस्य तस्य सक्तुवद-

संस्कार्यत्वात् । न च अर्थज्ञानस्य भाव्यत्वम्, अन्तरेणापि विधिं सामर्थ्या-
देवाधीतेन स्वाध्यायेनार्थज्ञानं जायत इत्यवगतेर्विधानार्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । न च
नियमार्थो विधिः, अक्रत्वर्थत्वात् । अवघातादयो हि क्रतावेव नियम्यन्ते, न
तण्डुलादिस्वरूपे; प्रमाणान्तरविरुद्धत्वात् । तस्मात् पुस्तकवाचना-
परिगृहीतादपि स्वाध्यायादर्थज्ञानं निष्पत्तिदर्शनाद् अधीतेनैव स्वाध्याये-
नार्थज्ञानं जायत इति नियमो न सम्भवति इति न तदर्थो विधिः । अतोऽ-
ध्ययनस्वाध्यायार्थज्ञानानामभाव्यत्वादन्वयस्य च कस्यापि शब्देन सामर्थ्येन
वोपादीयमानस्या भावादाद्याध्ययनमधिकृत्यार्थं वादानामसम्भवादार्थवादिक
फलमप्यत्र न रात्रिसत्रवत् सम्भवतीति, विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन सकलाध्येतृ-
पुरुषाभिलषितः स्वर्ग एव भाव्यतया कल्प्यते ।

न च धारणाध्ययनगोचरस्यार्थवादस्यातिदेशतः प्रथमाध्ययनेऽपि प्राप्ते-
रार्थवादिक फलान्वय इति वाच्यम्, अनतिदेश्यत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न च शब्द-
भावेनेति कर्तव्यतात्वेनातिदेशः, तदिति कर्तव्यतात्वेनापि प्राशस्त्यमात्र-
स्यैवातिदेशात् । अतोऽतिदेशतोऽपि फलस्याप्राप्तेः स्वर्गस्यैव भाव्यत्वम्,
इत्यर्थज्ञानस्याध्ययनसंस्कृतेन स्वाध्यायेन सम्पाद्यत्वं न विधिरवबोधयति इति
तदनुष्ठानस्य वैधत्ववैधुर्यात् तदनुरोधेन वैधस्य स्नानस्योत्कर्षासम्भवा-
च्चाध्ययनानन्तरं तद्धेतुका धर्मजिज्ञासा कर्तव्येति पूर्वः पक्षः ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—

अर्थबोधादिरूपस्य दृष्टस्य सति सम्भवे ।

फलस्य न फलं स्वर्गः कल्पनामधिरोहति ॥

दृष्टार्थत्वे सम्भवत्यदृष्टार्थत्वस्यान्याय्यत्वाद्, अर्थबोधादेश्च दृष्टस्यैव
फलस्य सम्भवान्न विश्वजिज्ञ्यायेन स्वर्गस्यावकाशः । न चाधीतात्

स्वाध्यायादर्थबोधादिसिद्धेः सामर्थ्यलभ्यत्वाद्विधानार्थक्यमिति वाच्यं,
नियमार्थत्वाद्विधेः । नचाक्रत्वर्थत्वान्न नियम इति वाच्यम्, अक्रत्वर्थेषु
द्रव्यार्जनादिषु पुरुषार्थेष्वपि नियमदर्शनात् । यत्त्वर्थबोधादेर्दृष्टत्वात् तत्र
नियमविधौ प्रमाणान्तरविरोध इत्युक्तं, तदयुक्तं; सर्वनियमविधीनां
दृष्टैकगोचरत्वात् । न हि प्रमाणान्तरागोचरे क्रतौ नियमः सम्भवति, तत्र
नखनिर्लुञ्चनादेरुपायान्तरस्याप्राप्तेः पक्षप्राप्त्यसम्भवादेवावघातादिनियमानु-
पपत्तेः । ननु दृष्टे तण्डुलादिस्वरूपेऽपि नियमो न सम्भवति प्रमाणान्तर-
विरोधादित्युक्तम् । सत्यम्; अत एव अवघातादेस्तण्डुलादिस्वरूपे नियमो
न सम्भवति प्रमाणान्तरविरोधादित्युक्तम् । सत्यम्; अत एव अवघातादे-
स्तण्डुलादिस्वरूपे साधनत्वमेव विधिविषयः, नियमस्त्ववाक्यार्थ एव
फलमात्रम्, इति नियमविदां रहस्यम् । भज्येत तर्ह्यज्ञातज्ञापनमिति चेन्मैवं,
यावद्धि तण्डुलादिसाधनत्वमेवावघातादेरन्वय व्यतिरेकमूलां व्याप्तिमवगम्य
पक्षधर्मत्वादि कञ्चानुसन्धायानुमातव्यं तावदतिशीघ्रया “व्रीहीनवहन्ति”
इत्यादिकया श्रुत्यैवावघातादेस्तण्डुलादिसाधनत्वस्य प्रथममवगतेः । श्रुते-
र्ल्लिङ्गतः श्रीघ्नप्रवृत्तेः । ननु त्रिकालाप्राप्तविषयो विधिः तश्चादपि सामर्थ्य-
लभ्यमर्थन्न विदधाति । मैवम्, नियमविधीनामनन्य लभ्यविषयत्वाभावात् ।
भावे वा पूर्वोक्तनयेन नियमविधित्वमङ्गप्रसङ्गात् । अतस्तण्डुलाद्यर्थिनां
नखनिर्लुञ्चनाद्युपायान्तरसम्भवेऽपि अवघातादेव नियमो प्रवृत्तिरिति
योऽयन्नियमः स विधेः फलं, तस्य च स्वयमफलस्य फलान्तराननु-
गुणत्वेऽपि विधिफलत्वानुपपत्तेः फलान्तरं कल्प्यं, तच्चावघातादिषु
प्रकृतत्वात् क्रतुरेव । याजनादिषु तु फलान्तरस्याप्रकृतत्वादुपायान्तरप्रवृत्तौ
प्रत्यवाय एव । अतोऽध्ययनमन्तरेणोपायान्तरप्रवृत्तौ प्रत्यवायकल्पनात्
तत्परिहारायाध्ययन एव प्रवृत्तिरिति योऽयं नियमः तत्सिद्ध्यर्थमन्यलभ्य-
मेवार्थं ज्ञानसाधनत्वगध्ययनस्य विधिरवबोधयतीति न काचिदनुपपत्तिः ।

Essentials of Prābhākaramimāmsā

The two schools of Pūrvamīmāṃsā viz. Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara are well known. Both claim Jaimini sūtras and Śābarabhāṣya as their sources. Some scholars have tried to trace some of the concepts of Prābhākaras to Bādari whose views are quoted in Jaimini sūtra. Attempts are also made to identify Bhavadāsa and Bhartṛmitra as the pre-cursors of Prābhākara view. References are also found in some old Prābhākaras as Cirantana Prābhākara and Jarat Prābhākara. Their views are quoted on two important topics viz. on the number of categories and the nature of akhyāti. Prameya Pārāyaṇa portion of Prakaraṇa Pañcikā is not available. However, its commentator Nārāyaṇa lists eight categories mentioning samkhyā and sādṛśya as seventh and eight. However, the view of the old Prābhākaras quoted by Vidyāraṇya in Vivaraṇaprameya Sangraha mentions viśeṣa and niyoga in place of samkhyā and sādṛśya. In respect of akhyāti also the old Prābhākaras had slightly different explanation than the one commonly given. Their view is quoted in Iṣṭasiddhi of Vimuktātman. From this it is clear that the Prābhākara thought had an early base and Prābhākara only rejuvenated it.

It is difficult to ascertain whether Śābara bhāṣya mainly supports Bhāṭṭa or Prābhākara. The most important sūtra 'Tadbhūtānām Kriyārthena Samāmnāyaḥ' etc. and Śābara's remarks on it seem to support anvitābhidhāna theory of sentence meaning. Śālikanātha quotes half a dozen

adhikaraṇas to establish kāryānvita procedure. All these seem to support this theory. However, a detailed scrutiny of the entire Bhāṣya with the help of computer has to be made to find out Śābara's support to one of them entirely or partially. Prābhākara was an younger contemporary of Kumārila. He quotes Kumārila's views in a number of adhikaraṇas, such as Guṇakāmadhikaraṇa, Abhikramaṇādhi karaṇa, Balābalādhi karaṇa. His only one work i.e. Bṛhatī, a detailed commentary on Śābara bhāṣya is available.

The literature of Bhāṭṭa school is quite large. There are only seven works of Prābhākara school. Bṛhatī of Prābhākara, Rjuvimala, Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, and Bhāṣyadīpa of Śālikanātha Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha, Tantrarahasya of Rāmānuja and Prābhākara Vijaya of Nandiśvara. Among these Śālikanātha's Prakaraṇa Pañcikā is the central text. It discusses all important issues and concepts of Prābhākara school in detail. Two Vārtikakāras are quoted in it. One is quoted in support of Prābhākara view, the other, who is an opponent of Prābhākara view. The latter is Kumārila bhāṭṭa. The first one seems to be an old Prābhākara writer.

Apart from the eight works of Prābhākara school, there is another source to know the Prābhākara thought. The works that criticise Prābhākara thought constitute this source. The earliest among these are the three important works of Mandana Mishra. His Vidhiviveka, Vibhramaviveka and Bhāvanā viveka examine Prābhākara concept of Kārya and their akhyāti theory in detail. These were composed before Śālikanātha. He answers the objections raised in these works. Vachaspati Mishra's commentary on

vidhiviveka quotes Śālikanātha's answers and shows the drawbacks from Mandana's point of view. Pārthasārathi Mishra's Śāstradīpikā, particularly, tarkapāda portion and his Nyāyaratnamālā review the important issues of Prābhākara system. This tradition of reviewing Prābhākara thought is continued in later Bhāṭṭa mīmāṃsā works.

Important writers of Nyāyavaiśeṣika and Vedānta schools also quote Prābhākara's theories and criticise. The kāryatāvāda, anvitābhidhānavāda and akhyātivāda are particularly criticised. Nyāya works like Nyāyamañjari of Jayanta, Kusumāñjali of Udayana, Tatvacintāmani of Gaṅgeśa review Prābhākara views. These works give a clearer picture of Prābhākara thought and constitute an important source. Modern scholars also have written good many works in English on Bhāṭṭa school by way of translations, studies and research papers. There are very few on Prābhākara system. Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā by Ganganatha Jha and by Paśupatiṇātha śastry are two important works on Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. The long introduction to Tantra-rahasya by K.S. Ramaswamy is quite informative. The papers on niyoga and Prābhākaras old and new by M. Hiriyanna and on Karma by Halbfass give an insight into Prābhākara thought. Prof. Kuppaswamy Śastry's two papers on old Prābhākaras give valuable information about early Prābhākaras.

The criticism of Prābhākara views is two fold :

i) criticism of the import of the injunction and the issues connected with the organisation of the sacrifice. ii) The issues connected with the epistemology and the theory of

knowledge. In the first area it is mainly a fight between Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras. In the second area, all other systems of Indian philosophy, particularly Nyāya and Vedānta participate and confront Prābhākaras.

Among the Vedānta schools Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita are a little friendly. Both these have accepted anvitābhi-dhāna theory with some modifications. Viśiṣṭādvaita theory of yathārtha khyāti is closer to akhyāti. The concept of difference being an internal attribute of the object is acceptable to Dvaita. In this way Prābhākara thought is preserved more by its opponents than its own literature.

Prakaraṇa Pañcikā gives a detailed account of the Prābhākara system in all aspects. These are given in the exposition along with the relevant portions of text in this study. Here the main issues are presented by way of recapitulation of the exposition of the text. There are eight main issues that require special attention. These are as under : i) The concept of kārya or niyoga is the import of Vedic injunction. ii) The theory of anvitābhidhāna, iii) Akhyāti theory of perceptual error iv) Rejection of abhāva v) Non-Vedic statements communicate through inference vi) The concept of tripitikaṇa vii) The nature of savikalpaka, nirvikalpaka viii) The categories.

The other systems of Indian Philosophy do not agree with Prābhākaras on these issues and have bitterly criticised. A proper understanding of the Prābhākara point of view on these issues will help to meet these criticisms and understand Prābhākara thought more clearly. This is attempted here.

1) The concept of Kārya

The Prābhākaras state that kārya is the import of Vedic injunction. This kārya has three dimensions. i) It is conveyed only by śabdapramāṇa i.e. Vedic injunction, but not by any other pramāṇa. To convey this aspect it is designated as apūrva i.e. mānāntara apūrva. ii) It elicits an agent who has the entitlement to undertake the kārya. Therefore, it is called niyoga i.e. direction or command. The person elicited is called niyojya, i.e. the person directed to accomplish kārya. iii) It inculcates a sense of accomplishing a task as 'this is my task'. Therefore it is called kārya. It is this kāryatā that is conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Its designation apūrva conveys its epistemological status as conveyed by śabdapramāṇa only. Its designation niyoga conveys the fact that it motivates the person who has the entitlement to undertake the task, and its designation as kārya conveys that it is of the nature of the accomplishment of a task. The task to be accomplished by it i.e. yāga, is conveyed by the root of the verb 'yajeta'. This yāgakriyā is the subject matter of kārya. It is also the instrument i.e. karaṇa. Yāga is both the subject and instrument of kārya.

The injunctive suffix conveys kṛti i.e. initiative also. No kārya can be accomplished without initiative. Therefore, kṛti i.e. initiative, is also conveyed by the injunctive suffix. The initiative has to operate through an activity. Such an activity, in the present context, is yāgakriyā. This yāgakriyā gives a form to kārya conveyed by the Vedic injunction. Therefore, it is its content or viṣaya. It is also karaṇa, not

in the sense that it produces kārya but in the sense that it gives a form to it. The kṛti is called bhāvanā as it leads to kārya which is bhāvya i.e. the goal. Keeping this role of kṛti in mind kārya is defined as *kṛtyuddeśyam kṛtipradhānam kāryam*. This kārya is distinct from kriyā so far as the Vedic injunctions are concerned. In the case of ordinary injunctions kriyā is called kārya in the secondary sense. It is already stated that this kārya is designated as apūrva taking into account the fact that it is conveyed by śabdapramāṇa only. For another reason also it is called apūrva. When yāgakriyā is duly performed, kārya is accomplished. In this accomplished state it is something unique. Therefore, it is called apūrva. To distinguish the two usages it is called pandāpūrva at that stage. It is with this kārya that all other items get connected. Niyojya, the yāga, and aṅgas i.e. auxiliaries, get connected with it. The kārya connected with all these constitutes vākyārtha and vedārtha for Prābhākaras. In this context it should be noted that the terms bhāvanā and apūrva are used in Prābhākara system in altogether different senses than Bhāttas system. Bhāttas use the term bhāvanā in the sense of two bhāvanās viz. śābdibhāvanā and ārthibhāvanā envisaged by them. Prābhākaras use it in the sense of kṛti. Prābhākaras do not accept the scheme of śābdibhāvanā and ārthibhāvanā as conveyed by the injunctive suffix. The term apūrva is used in the sense of a concept that serves as link between yāga and svarga by Bhāttas while Prābhākaras have made it a designation of kārya to indicate its unique nature. It is not a link between yāga and svarga. It is the goal of the performance of yāga.

Now, we have to find out the role of svargakāmanā, and the position of svarga in this scheme. Svargakāmanā is a qualification that entitles a person to undertake such sacrifices that provide svarga. He is adhikārin i.e. a person entitled, for these kāmya sacrifices. The injunctions of these sacrifices elicit only such persons as niyojya who have a desire for svarga. When he is elicited as niyojya he comprehends it as his kārya and proceeds to perform the sacrifice concerned. It is kāryatājñāna that motivates him. Iṣṭakāmanā only provides him the entitlement i.e. adhikāra, of course he obtains svarga, not as a primary result but as a secondary result. The primary result is the accomplishment of kārya itself. This kārya provides the secondary result since, this secondary result viz. svarga, had provided entitlement to the niyojya who accomplished kārya. It is something like a master providing maintenance to his servant to serve his own purpose. Iṣṭasādhana is not the import of the injunction. It is only a ground to acquire entitlement.

This kāryatā theory of the import of Vedic injunction is criticised by almost every other system of Indian philosophy. It is criticised on two grounds i) The very nature of kārya cannot be satisfactorily explained ii) As it is not of the nature of happiness or means of happiness it cannot motivate and generate initiative to undertake any activity.

The earliest criticism of the concept of kārya is found in Vidhiviveka of Mandana Mishra. He neatly sums up the concept of kārya or niyoga as proposed by Prābhākaras and examines it clause by clause.

यदपि दर्शनम् – प्रमाणान्तरागोचरः शब्दमात्रावलम्बनः नियुक्तोऽस्मीति प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयः सुखादिवत् अपरामृष्टकालत्रयः लिङ्गादीनामर्थो विधिरिति । (वि.वि. पृ. ३५)

Two important clauses in this explanation of kārya or niyoga are i) That which is not conveyed by any other pramāṇa but conveyed by only śabdapramāṇa ii) That which has no reference to particular time. Mandana Mishra argues that since the so called kārya or niyoga is not conveyed by any pramāṇa the very vāchya-vāchakabhāva relation between the injunctive suffix and kārya cannot be ascertained. Therefore, śabda also cannot convey kārya or niyoga. Śālikanātha notices this objection as under.

ननु व्युत्पत्त्यपेक्षेषु शब्देष्वर्थाभिधायिषु ।

कथं मानान्तरावेद्यं कार्यमाहुः लिङ्गादयः ॥

Śālikanātha answers this objection by pointing out that the vāchya-vāchaka bhāva relation between the injunctive suffix and kārya is comprehended through elders' conversation as in the case of other words. Vāchaspati Mishra elaborates this answer in his Tattvakaṇikā a commentary on Vidhiviveka as under.

इदमत्र आकृतम् - कार्याभिधायिता तावत् लिङ्गादीनामवगता आचार्यवाक्येषु 'माणवक! समिधमाहर' इत्यादिषु । एतद्वाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं प्रवर्तमानं समिदाहरणे माणवकमुपलभ्य पार्श्वस्थो व्युत्पित्सुः एवमवधारयति । बुद्धिपूर्व्यमस्य प्रवृत्तिः स्वतन्त्रप्रवृत्तित्वात् मदीयप्रवृत्तिवत् । अहं च न क्रियामात्रावगमात् नापि फलमात्रावगमात् नापि फलसाधनत्वावगमात् किन्तु कार्यतावगमात् प्रवृत्तः । न खलु अन्ततः अर्भकः स्तनपानादिकमपि

क्रियां कार्यतया यावन्नावगतवान् तावत् न तस्यामपि प्रवृत्तः ।

(त.क. पृ.३८)

Both Mandana Mishra and Vāchaspati Mishra are not satisfied with this reply and the debate is going on.

The second clause viz. that which has no reference to time is also questioned by Mandana Mishra. He argues that if it has no reference to time, it cannot be an entity. It will be a non-entity i.e. 'asat' like a barren woman's son. It will have no sattā i.e. existence. However, Prābhākaras define 'sat' in a different way. They define 'sat' as that which is conveyed by a pramāṇa. They do not accept sattā jāti. Sattva is svarūpasattva for them. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas talk of sattā jāti for first three categories viz. dravya, guṇa and karma only. The other categories viz. sāmānya, viśeṣa etc do not have sattā jāti. These have only svarūpa sattā. Niyoga or kārya has such svarūpasattā. We may note here that even Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas define a category as prameyatva.

The main objection raised against kārya or niyoga by its critics is that it cannot motivate to undertake the tāsk. To motivate for undertaking activity, the object concerned should enkindle desire. Happiness or the means of the happiness only enkindle the desire to undertake an activity. Kārya is neither of the nature of happiness nor it is a means of happiness. Mere kāryatā-jñāna does not motivate the activity. It is iṣṭasāadhanatā-jñāna that motivates the activity.

This contention is not acceptable to Prābhākaras. They argue that by an analysis of the experience it is found that it

is kāryatā jñāna that prompts a person to undertake a task but not mere iṣṭasāadhanatā-jñāna. The latter is only a step to comprehend kāryatā. One will not proceed to act only by the knowledge that something is the means of happiness. He has to consider it as a task to be undertaken by him. The expectation of the desired result only creates interest in the task but the actual undertaking of the task has to be prompted by the sense that now it is my task. That is to say, he has to realise that he is niyojya for that kārya.

Inculcating such a sense of kārya is much more evident in the case of Vedic injunction. Accomplishing kārya conveyed by a Vedic injunction is an end by itself it is not a means to happiness. In the case of kāmya karma, the happiness is only a side product. In the case of nitya i.e. obligatory rites, it is not there even as side-product.

This position of Prābhākaras has a historical background in the Indian cultural tradition. In the Vedic period the rituals were considered as having their own efficacy. The performance of the rituals itself was a holy act and a value. It gave a satisfaction to the performer. The idea of obtaining any outside happiness is only a later development. Even the kāmyakarmas were performed as if they were nityakarmas. This can be made out by the fact that agñihotra originally was a nityakarma and later was made a kāmya karma also. Nityakarmas were always considered as superior to kāmya karmas. The concept of niṣkāmakarma developed later is a rejuvenation of the early concept of karma being a task of accomplishment for its own sake but not for any outside result. This tradition of

performance of karma for its own sake is upheld by Prābhākaras. The Bhāttas were influenced by the other viewpoint that the rituals and other activities are meant for deriving happiness. This is at the basis of the controversy whether *iṣṭasādhanatā-jñāna* prompts activity or *kāryatājñāna*. The clause *sukhādivat* in the explanation of the nature of *niyoga* or *kārya* brings out this aspect the problem. The accomplishment of *kārya* is as much an end as deriving happiness. It is not an instrumental value. It is an intrinsic value.

The *kārya* is more an ethical concept than a ritualistic concept. Even if it is taken as a ritualistic concept, it has to be taken out of empirical level and has to be looked upon as a mystical or transcendental value. Achieving such a mystical efficacy of Vedic rituals is the goal of performing Vedic rituals. The other benefits are side products.

The criticism of *kāryatā* theory has a linguistic dimension also. Whether the language is learnt through the elders' conversation by observing their activity or it is learnt by introducing the object as they are is an old controversy. These two approaches are designated as '*kārye vyutpatti*' and '*siddhe vyutpatti*'. The former makes the action conveyed by the verb the focal point and the centre of semantic organisation in a sentence and the latter makes the noun as the centre of semantic organisations. The latter, naturally opposes the *kāryatā* theory of linguistic communication.

Another aspect of linguistic communication is that whether the linguistic communication is meant just to give

knowledge or to prompt action also. For those who hold the first view, it is sufficient if the injunction informs that the sacrifice leads to the desired result. It need not specifically command to accomplish the task. The criticism of the theory of *kāryatā* is based on these controversies.

Further, informing something as the means of happiness is taken for granted as sure means of prompting activity and the other nature of man acting on the urge to accomplish a task is completely ignored.

The critics have also failed to understand the difference between *kriyā* a physical event, and *kārya* an ethical or transcendental touch given to it. To convey this aspect of *kārya*, it is designated as *apūrva*. A modern scholar has remarked that the Prābhākara have carefully avoided mentioning the ontological status of *kārya*. However, it may be pointed out that they have stated *kriyā* as its content. That is its status at empirical level. At ethical and transcendental level the question of its ontological status in the manner of an empirical entity does not arise. It may be noted that the old Prābhākaras had given the status of a separate category to *niyoga*.

2) The *anvitābhidhāna* theory of sentence meaning

It is noticed above that *niyoga* or *kārya* elicits the agent as *niyojya* and *yāga* as *viṣaya*. It also elicits *aṅgas* etc other requirements to accomplish *kārya*. By eliciting all these *kāryānvita vākyaārtha* takes its full shape as the import of Vedic injunction. This means that all requirements for the accomplishment of *kārya* are organised into a unit and

kārya is accomplished. These do not serve any purpose individually in isolation. These serve the purpose of accomplishing kārya as connected with kārya. This process has to be reflected in the language that conveys kārya as connected with these. Therefore, individual terms conveying different items of this programme have to reflect this connection as a part of their meaning. For this purpose, the Prābhākaras have evolved the anvitābhīdhāna theory of sentence meaning. This theory of anvitābhīdhāna is intimately connected with the concept of kārya centered organisation of sacrificial programme. Śālikanātha clearly states this purpose at the commencement of the exposition of anvitābhīdhāna theory.

अपूर्वमेव वाक्यार्थ इति साधनीयम् । तस्य मूलं पदानामन्विताभि-
धायितेति तामेव तावदादौ परिशोधयति । (प्र.पं. ३७६)

According to anvitābhīdhāna theory of sentence meaning a word conveys its meaning as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word. Subordinate words convey their meanings as connected with the meaning of the main word. Such connected meanings of the words is the sentence meaning. Contributing to the evolution of the chief meaning is the purpose of all other words. That is the import of the whole sentence. Neither the individual words are the means of communication separately, nor the meanings of the individual words are intended to be communicated.

प्रधानगुणभावेन लब्धान्योन्यसमन्वयान् ।

पदार्थानेव वाक्यार्थान् सङ्गिरन्ते विपश्चितः ॥ (प्र.पं. ३७७)

On this theory of anvitābhīdhāna two objections are raised by the critics of this theory viz. आनन्त्य and अन्योन्याश्रय.

i) According to this theory each word is expected to convey its meaning as connected with the meaning of the relevant other word in the sentence. This connection is included in the scope of the meaning of the word. The other word will be different in different sentences. Consequently the meaning of a word has to be as connected with the meanings of those many words. This means that each word will have an unlimited number of connections as its meanings. To have śaktigraha of a word with such a large number of meanings of other words is impossible.

ii) The second objection is that when it is considered that a word conveys its meaning as connected with the meaning of relevant other word, is the other word also has to be taken as conveying its meaning as connected with the meaning of this word or not? In the first alternative it will result in reciprocal dependency i.e. anyonyāśraya.

The first objection does not hold good if the way in which the connection is effected and ascertained is examined. The connection envisaged among the word meanings in a sentence is based on three criteria viz ākāṅkṣā, sannidhi and yogyatā. Among these ākāṅkṣā is very important. A word conveys the meaning connected with the meaning of the relevant other word that has the ākāṅkṣā. This ākāṅkṣā in respect of different words in a sentence does not arise simultaneously or in a disorderly

way. The import of the injunction viz kārya i.e. apūrva, is the central meaning of a Vedic injunctive sentence. This needs viśaya i.e. yāga. It also needs niyojya to perform yāga. Then karaṇopakāras are needed. All these have an ākāṅkṣā with the central meaning i.e. kārya, and are conveyed as connected with that meaning in the respective order. In view of this orderly connection there is no room for any reciprocal dependency. Nor there is any need to envisage innumerable denotative powers to each word to account for its occurrence in different sentences.

The answers to these objections are succinctly put by Pārthasārathi Mishra himself while summarising the Prābhākara point of view.

सन्निध्यपेक्षायोग्यत्वैरुपलक्षणलाभतः ।

आनन्त्येप्यन्वितानां स्यात् सम्बन्धग्रहणं मम ॥

न च सन्निध्यपेक्षत्वे भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ (न्या.र.मा. १८-१९)

These objections are answered by Śālikanātha in detail in Prakaraṇa Pañcikā. The main points of the answer are summarised in the above verses. Pārthasārathi does not rake up these objections further. He has a different objection against anvītābhīdhānavāda. He argues that if the word has to convey connected word meaning, then, it has to have two denotative powers viz one denotative power to convey the word meaning and another to convey the connection.

अन्विताभिधायित्वे हि पदानामवश्यमेव विशेषणभूतोप्यन्वयोऽभि-

धातव्यः । अन्यथा अन्वितप्रतीतेरुत्पत्त्ययोगात् । ततश्चान्वयान्वितविषय-
शक्तिद्वयकल्पनात् अदृष्टकल्पना गुरुतरा स्यात् ।

This is merely a procedural point. The substantial issue is whether the words are capable of communicating individually in an isolated way or only as a part of a syntactically knit unit. In other words whether word is a unit of communication or sentence is a unit of communication. Particularly, in the context of communicating the organisation of a sacrificial programme through the Vedic injunction. To protect the unity of the programme, the unity of its communication is essential. This point seems to have been ignored by abhihitānvaya vādins.

3) Akhyāti theory of perceptual error

In Indian philosophy the theories of perceptual error have played an important role. There are five dimensions of these theories. i) optical ii) psychological iii) epistemological iv) logical and v) metaphysical.

The process of error starts at optical level, the psychological level adds to it. It takes epistemological shape. These three aspects have to be taken into account while analysing the nature of error. The analysis has to satisfy the logical requirement. Different schools of Indian philosophy have different metaphysical views. They have worked out their theories of perceptual error within the framework of their metaphysical systems. Consequently every school has its own theory. These theories are known as khyāti theories. These could be broadly grouped into i)

Idealists ii) Realists in the first instance, and within the realists anyathākhyāti vādins and yathārtha khyāti vādins.

Ātmakhyāti and asatkhyāti come under the idealist view. The anyathākhyāti of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, viparīta khyāti of Bhāttas and abhinava anyathākhyāti of Dvaita Vedānta come under anyathā-khyāti group. Akhyāti of Prābhākara, yathārtha khyāti of Rāmānujas and satkhyāti of Sāmkhyas come under the yathārtha khyāti group. The advaita theory of anirvachanīyakhyāti is a class by itself. It is based on the advaita concept of sad-asad vilakṣana metaphysics. The basic premise of the idealists is that there are no objects outside knowledge. The premise of the anyathākhyāti vādin is that one entity is comprehended as another. The yathārtha khyātivādins hold that the cognition agrees with the entities cognised. There is a good deal of debate on this theory in the major works of these schools. But the chief opponent for the realists is idealist. Among the realists the Prābhākaras have been targeted by all. It is surprising to find that the anyathākhyāti vādins have made room for *asat* element in their explanation which cuts the very ground of realism. Their criticism of akhyāti is more in procedural aspect of their explanation of error than on any substantial basis. The akhyāti theory is narrated below.

The Prābhākaras have adopted akhyāti theory. According to this theory all cognitions are true. Yathārtham sarvavijñānam' Prābhākaras explain this position as under.

Whatever is presented in a cognition that is its object. That which is presented in the cognition is termed as 'bhāsamāna' and the object is termed as 'vedya'. These two

always agree. In other words the content of the cognition and the fact conveyed by it always agree.

The knowledge communicated by the statement 'Idam rajatam' on seeing śukti is the usual example of perceptual error. According to anyathākhyāti theory of perceptual error śukti is the object of this knowledge. However, it is presented as *rajata*. In other words one is presented as another. 'A' is presented as 'B'. Therefore, it is anyathākhyāti.

Prābhākaras do not agree with this analysis. According to them the statement '*idam rajatam*' represents two cognitions i.e. perception and memory. One who observes śukti i.e. shell, present before him cognises it as *Idam* i.e. this, in a general way without the comprehension of its special features which distinguish it from *rajata* i.e. silver. Due to the similarity between śukti and *rajata* he remembers *rajata*. The cognition of śukti and the memory of *rajata* occur in such quick sequence that he does not realise the difference between the two cognitions of the objects conveyed by them.

The contents of both these cognitions agree with the facts conveyed by them. There is no disagreement between the contents of these two cognitions and the objects conveyed.

Though the two cognitions '*idam*' and '*rajatam*' are true and distinct an erroneous statement is made as '*Idam rajatam*' due to the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions and their objects. For the non-realisation of the difference the following factors are responsible.

i) The absence of the comprehension of the distinct features of śukti and its comprehension merely as 'idam' in a general way. ii) Remembering rajata due to the similarity between śukti and rajata. iii) Absence of the reference to the past time in the memory of rajata iv) occurrence of the two cognitions in quick succession.

These circumstances lead to the non-realisation of the distinction between the two cognitions and their objects. This leads to the statement i.e. vyāvahāra, as '*idam rajatam*'. It is this statement that is bhrāmā. It is this vyāvahāra that is repudiated later.

The non-realisation of the distinction is termed as viveka agraha and the absence of the reference to the past time in the memory is termed as tattāpramoṣa. Tattā means reference to the past time and pramoṣa means the deletion of it. This analysis of '*idam rajatam*' offered by Prābhākaras is termed as akhyātivāda.

Śālikanātha himself mentions some of the objections raised against ākhyātivāda and answers. These are as under :

i) The so called memory of rajata cannot be classed as memory as it lacks the main feature of the memory viz. reference to the past time.

ii) Idam and rajatam are stated with sāmānādhikaranyā. Therefore, the two refer to one and the same. Idam refers to something that is presently observed before. Therefore, rajata also should refer to the same.

iii) Pravṛtti i.e. initiative to fetch the object seen cannot be

properly explained in the akhyāti theory. The mere occurrence of the cognitions of 'idam' and 'rajatam' in quick succession and the non-realisation of the difference between the two cannot motivate the observer to proceed to fetch rajata. Non-realisation of the difference is a negative factor. It cannot motivate pravṛtti i.e. initiative. The initiative is possible only if the sāmānādhikaranyā between idam and rajatam is realised. The sāmānādhikaranyā between dharma and dharmi has to be brought about. This means śukti has to be comprehended as rajata. This is exactly anyathākhyāti. In the analysis of this cognition by akhyātivādin sāmānādhikaranyā is not worked out.

iv) If the knowledge represented by the statement idam rajatam is true, then, how is it that it is repudiated as '*na idam rajatam*' later. What is it that is repudiated? Mere realisation of the difference that was not comprehended earlier is not the repudiation.

Stating these objections Śālikanātha answers them as follows :

i) The rajata cognition is considered as memory since it is caused by the impressions of the earlier cognition of rajata. These impressions are roused by the similarity between śukti and rajata. However, the reference to the past time is not roused due to inadequate attention. Producing by the impressions of the past experience is the chief feature of memory. Reference to the past time is incidental.

ii) The purpose of sāmānādhikaranyā in the case of true rajata is served by the samāna rūpatā here. Not only the

difference between the cognitions 'idam' and 'rajata' is not realised but also the difference between the earlier cognition of rajata and these two cognitions is not realised. Therefore, there is samāna rūpatā here. This serves the purpose of sāmānādhikarāṇya.

iii) This samāna rūpatā supported by the non-realisation of the difference facilitates the statement i.e. vyavahāra as 'idam rajatam' and motivates the initiative i.e. pravṛtti to proceed to fetch the object.

iv) As regards the bādha i.e. repudiation, it has to be clarified that by the realisation of the difference between the object of the cognition idam i.e. śukti, and that of rajatam i.e. silver, the observer gets correct knowledge of śukti. This enables him to discover that the statement i.e. vyavahāra 'idam rajatam' was not bonafide. It is this statement that is repudiated. It is more a discovery of śukti than the repudiation of rajata.

In spite of these clarifications, the same objections are raised again and again in the works of other schools. While the works of the other schools are produced century after century, there were no works on Prābhākara side. However, it should be said to the credit of these opponents that they kept the Prābhākara theory alive and analysed it more and more to find fault in it. Some of the new objections not mentioned by Śālikanātha are given below.

i) According to Prābhākaras the difference is an integral attribute of the object concerned, that is to say, it is dharmi-svarūpa. When an object is cognised its attribute

i.e. the difference, is also cognised. In the present case, the cognition 'idam' has to be cognised along with the difference it has from the other cognitions and the cognition 'rajatam' has to be cognised along with its difference from the other cognitions. Thus, the cognition of the difference between these two cognitions is part and parcel of the these two cognitions. Therefore, Prābhākara cannot talk of the non-realisation of the difference between the two cognitions.

This objection can be answered as follows : Though the difference is an integral attribute of the object and can be comprehend in a general way as this object is different from all others in a general way, to comprehend the difference from a specific object, the presentation of that object as a pratiyogin is necessary. In the present case, the cognitions 'idam' and 'rajata' are not presented as pratiyogins for each other since these have occurred in quick succession. Hence, their difference is not comprehended.

ii) Non-realisation of the difference is of the nature of abhāva. Prābhākaras do not accept abhāva. Therefore, they cannot make it a ground to explain the error.

This can be answered as follows : Though Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva, they have their own explanation to the situations wherein the cognition of abhāva is claimed by abhāvavādins. The cognition of the object and its attribute the difference is sansṛṣṭa viśaya buddhi, and cognising the object alone is ekaviśaya

buddhi. Such ekaviśaya buddhi is found here in respect of these two cognitions in view of quick succession so far as the attribute difference is concerned. The difference is dr̥śya pratiyogin here.

4) The rejection of Abhāva and Abhāvapramāṇa

The Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva. Consequently, they do not accept abhāva-pramāṇa also.

To understand the Prābhākara's stand that the abhāva is not a separate category their concepts of sansr̥ṣṭa-viśaya buddhi and ekaviśayabuddhi need to be analysed. When two positive entities are cognised together it is sansr̥ṣṭa viśaya buddhi while cognising only one of them is ekaviśaya buddhi. The latter serves the purpose of abhāva.

For instance, cognising the ground and jar together is sansr̥ṣṭaviśaya buddhi while cognising ground alone is ekaviśayabuddhi. In the latter case, abhāvavādins claim that there is the abhāva of jar. What has really happened is that ekaviśaya buddhi has taken place instead of sansr̥ṣṭaviśaya buddhi. The absence of jar is not a separate fact. Therefore, no separate pramāṇa is necessary to cognise it.

It cannot be argued that how can ekaviśaya buddhi arise in respect of the same ground about which there was sansr̥ṣṭaviśaya buddhi without the cognition of the abhāva of the jar. This is answered by a counter question that how can abhāva buddhi arise with reference to the same place where in there was bhāva buddhi of a jar earlier? If the withdrawal of the jar is stated as the ground for abhāva

buddhi, then, same may be taken as the ground for ekaviśaya buddhi.

The jar is designated as dr̥śya pratiyogin i.e. an object that could be cognised if it were present. When one cognises the ground without the jar he reflects on the dr̥śyapratiyogin i.e. jar, that was present earlier and realises that he is cognising the ground alone. No additional factor i.e. abhāva is cognised. The statement that 'there is no jar' only means that the sansr̥ṣṭa viśaya buddhi of the ground and jar is replaced by the ekaviśaya buddhi of the ground.

Even in the case of pradhvansābhāva, on the destruction of jar the cognition of jar is replaced by the cognition of its pieces. No additional factor like pradhvansābhāva is cognised. The statements like ghatābhāva, patābhāva also mean that the respective sansr̥ṣṭa viśaya buddhi is replaced by ekaviśaya buddhi. The reference to the pratiyogins is a reference to the respective dr̥śyapratiyogins i.e. the objects that could be cognised if these were present as a part of the content of the respective sansr̥ṣṭaviśaya buddhi.

Those who accept abhāva as a separate category accept anupalabdhi i.e. pramāṇābhāva, as the means to comprehend abhāva. This is also not acceptable to Prābhākaras. Anupalabdhi i.e. the absence of cognition by the appropriate pramāṇa cannot be the means of cognition by its very presence as in the case of the eye being the means of cognition by its very nature. One has to have the knowledge of the absence of pramāṇa as in the case of the knowledge of liṅga for anumāna. If it is accepted that

pramāṇābhāva is pramāṇa only when it is known, then, for the knowledge of abhāvapramāṇa another abhāvapramāṇa will be required and so on. This leads to infinite regress.

Finally, Prābhākaras explain the Śabara's remark अभावोऽपि प्रमाणाभावः नास्ति इत्यस्य अर्थस्य असन्निकृष्टस्य as supporting the rejection of abhāva. This very remark is interpreted by Bhāttas as the definition of abhāva-pramāṇa. Śālikanātha takes pains to interpret it in support of the rejection of abhāvapramāṇa. However, his explanation is laboured and not convincing. This is explained in the Amṛtakalā section of this text. The question of abhāvapramāṇa is discussed in detail both in Amṛtakalā chapter and pramāṇa pārayāṇa under abhāva.

5) Non-Vedic statements communicate through the inference of the speakers knowledge

According to Prābhākaras the pauraṣeya statements are not śabdapramāṇa. These help to infer the speaker's knowledge and communicate the same. By the statement of a speaker his knowledge of the facts represented by his statement is inferred. His statement plays the double role of serving as a means to infer his knowledge and communicate it to the listeners. In the first role it is a liṅga i.e. the means or the ground of the inference. Its second role is verbal communication. If the meaning communicated by the statement does not represent the knowledge of the speaker of the facts mentioned in the statement it is a defect of its role as a liṅga, that is to say, the speaker has not invested it with the knowledge which

the statement is expected to communicate. This may be due to the defect or inadequacy of the speaker's knowledge itself or his intention not to communicate his knowledge truly. In any case, it is a case of a defective liṅga. This naturally makes the second role of the statement viz verbal communication defective, that is to say, it disagrees with the facts supposed to have been communicated by that statement. In this process, though there may not be any śabda doṣa, puruṣa doṣa is responsible for the disagreement between the statement and the facts.

It is found that the statements that do not agree with the facts are made for the following reasons :

- i) The speaker's knowledge itself is erroneous.
- ii) He has no intention to speak truly.
- iii) He is out of his mind.
- iv) He formulates the statement defectively as a result of which something different than what he intends is presented in the statement.

In all these instances, the relation between the knowledge supposed to have been communicated and the statement which is expected to represent it is violated. That is to say, the vyāpti relation between the knowledge to be communicated and the statement is broken. Therefore, the statement fails to play its first role of being the liṅga to infer the knowledge, that the speaker intends to communicate. Consequently it fails in its second role of valid communication.

There seems to be some difficulty in working out the process of the inference of the knowledge of the speaker by his statement. In order to proceed to infer the knowledge of the speaker from his statement the listener has to understand the meaning of the statement. This means that the statement has already communicated to him what it is expected to communicate. Then, the listener need not take the trouble to infer the knowledge through the statement and get it communicated by the same statement.

To solve this difficulty one has to understand the process of the inference in a little more detail.

When a statement is heard the facts referred to by the words are brought to the mind of the listener. Then, he proceeds to sort out as to how these could be meaningfully organised. This process is termed vimarśa. Then, he arrives at an organised sense. From this he infers the knowledge of these facts on the part of the speaker and finally inters the position of the facts. This crystalised position is finally communicated by the statement.

The first stage viz reminding of the facts by the meaning of the words and their organisation is only a step towards inference of the knowledge of the speaker. It is not crystallized final communication. The listener has to go through the process of inference to arrive at the final verbal communication.

The advantage of making the inference of the knowledge of the speaker the ground for verbal communication in non-Vedic speech is to provide a ground for sorting out the true

statements and false statements. In Vedic speech there is no question of false statement.

6) The formula of triputikaraṇa

An important contribution of Prābhākaras to the concept of pratyakṣa is extending its scope beyond the sense perception. So far as the external objects are concerned the perception is through the senses. However, there are two other items that are directly cognised. These are the knower and the knowledge.

The knowledge produced by senses, inference, sanskāra etc all means is of the nature of perception in respect of the knower and the knowledge itself. All cognitions in which some or other object is presented, the knower is also presented. The objects are not comprehended without the comprehension of the knower also along with them. It is clear from the statement 'I know this' otherwise the statement would have been as 'He knows this.' In case the knower is not comprehended there would not have been any difference between one's own knowledge and the knowledge of someone else.

The knowledge is self revealing. It does not require another knowledge to reveal it. It is well known that according to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas the knowledge of the objects is known as vyavasāya and the knowledge of this knowledge is anuvyavasāya. Prābhākaras do not agree with this arrangement. Every knowledge conveys three entities viz the knower, the object known, and the knowledge. No knowledge arises without a reference to the knower and the

object known. These three are always conveyed together. This procedure is designated as tripūtīkaraṇa.

This formula is evolved to rule out the Buddhist's contention that there are no objects outside the knowledge. According to this formula, if there were no objects outside, then, the knowledge itself would not have arisen. It is not the knowledge that is to be utilised to ascertain the existence of the objects, but it is the object that gives rise to the knowledge. One cannot think of the existence of knowledge without the existence of the object to be known and the knower.

According to this formula of tripūtī-karaṇa the ascertainment of the existence of the object and the knowledge does not depend upon either knowledge alone or the object alone. But the two help to ascertain the presence of both jointly.

7) Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perceptions

The Prābhākaras explanation of these two stages of perceptions is quite different from that of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas.

In nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa mere svalakṣaṇa is not presented as contended by Buddhists. Both the substance and attributes are presented in nirvikalpaka. However, these are isolated in nirvikalpaka while in savikalpaka these are organised.

Both general and the particular features of the object are presented in nirvikalpaka. But these are not so realised until some more objects in which this general aspect is

observed or from which particular aspects are contrasted are observed. In the savikalpaka pratyakṣa these aspects are realised.

In the nirvikalpaka though the attributes are comprehended, these are not comprehended as qualifying the object. At that stage the difference between the substance and attributes is not grasped. The difference could be grasped only through anvaya and vyatireka. This anvaya and vyatireka verification does not take place at the nirvikalpaka stage. Consequently these are not organised as qualifications and the qualified. Therefore, there is no viśīṣṭapratyaya at the nirvikalpaka stage. In savikalpaka as already stated these are organised.

Now, a question may be raised here. The perception is caused by sense contact. The sense is in contact with only that object which is actually perceived. It is not in contact with other objects either of the same class or any other. Therefore, it is difficult to agree with the contention that the general and the special aspects are cognised involving a reference to other objects in the savikalpaka stage.

This difficulty is solved by pointing out that the ātman who is to comprehend the object presented in his perception does comprehend the general and particular aspects with the aid of sanskāra i.e. the impressions of the cognitions of the other object cognised earlier.

According to Prābhākaras, to have viśīṣṭa pratyaya, it is not necessary that viśeṣaṇa also must be present by the perception only. In the case of savikalpaka perception when

the viśeṣaṇas are perceived in the cognition of the object concerned, the corresponding viśeṣaṇas of the object seen earlier are brought to the observer's mind by sanskāra.

8) Number and the nature of categories according to Prābhākaras

While explaining the objects that are cognised by the perception Śālikanātha mentions three categories viz dravya, jāti and guṇa and gives the details of four dravyas viz prithvi, ap, tejas and vāyu. He also mentions colour, taste etc sixteen guṇas. The commentator gives full details of the categories.

1) Substance, qualities, motion, universal, inherence, power, number and similarity are the eight categories.

It may be noted here that abhāva is dropped and śakti, sādṛśya are added.

2) The nine substances are same as those of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. Twenty two qualities are common to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas and Prābhākaras. sankhyā and laghutva are dropped.

3) Motion i.e. karma, represents both ordinary motion and ritual activities. Motion is not perceived. It is inferred.

4) Śakti is present in all positive entities. Samkhyā cannot be considered as substance as it is found in qualities. It cannot be considered as a quality as it is found in many. Sadrśya is a distinct category distinct from the substance, qualities etc.

5) In respect of the concepts of jāti i.e. universal, and samavāya. Prābhākaras have made some improvements in the Nyāyavaiśeṣika position. These answer some of the objections raised against these concepts.

This brief sketch of the major theories and concepts of Prābhākaras will give an idea of the distinct contribution made by Prābhākaras to Indian philosophical thought. Prakaraṇa Pañcikā gives a detailed exposition of these issues. This text is very terse. The terminology of Prābhākara system is quite different from other systems with which a student of Indian philosophy is familiar. Therefore, an exposition of this text in English is attempted here. Extracts of the relevant portions of the text are given for ready reference. It also helps to check the exposition with reference to the original text. The entire text is covered. However, ritualistic details and laboured arguments supplemented to the main arguments are avoided to maintain the clarity of the presentation.

Prof. K.T. Pandurangi

The Important differences between Bhāttas and Prābhākaras

Bhāttas

Prābhākaras

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| 1. Preranā or iṣṭasādhana is the import of the Vedic injunction.
2. Pauruṣeya vākya also comes under śabdapramāṇa.
3. Bhāttas accept abhīhātānvaya.
4. Bhāttas accept the category of abhāva and anupalabdhi pramāṇa.
5. Bhāttas accept both śrutarthāpatti and dṛṣṭarthāpatti.
6. According to Bhāttas the knowledge is inferred.
7. Bhāttas accept viprita khyāti for perceptual error.
8. The categories are five viz., substance, attributes, motion and universal.
9. Śabda and tamas are accepted as additional substances.
10. Vāyu and karma are perceived.
11. The injunction to study Veda is a separate injunction. | 1. Kārya or niyoga is the import of Vedic injunction.
2. Pauruṣeya vākya only helps to infer the knowledge of the speaker. It does not come under śabdapramāṇa.
3. Prābhākaras accept anvitābhidhāna.
4. Prābhākaras do not accept the category of abhāva. Consequently, they do not accept anupalabdhi pramāṇa i.e., abhāva pramāṇa.
5. Prābhākaras accept only dṛṣṭarthāpatti.
6. According to Prābhākaras the knowledge is self revealing.
7. Prābhākaras accept akhyāti.
8. The categories are eight viz., substance, attributes, motion, universal, potency, similarity, number and inference.
9. Not accepted.
10. Vāyu and karma are inferred.
11. The injunction to study Veda is consequential of the injunction to teach Veda. |
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12. The relation between jāti and vyakti is bhedā-abheda. 12. The relation between jāti and vyakti is bhedā. The bhedā i.e., difference, is an internal attribute of the object (dhamisvarūpa).

These are important differences. They also differ in many details. Particularly, in the process of organizing the sacrifices and the injunctive sentence that conveys it.

Glossary of Technical Words

अङ्गम् : A subsidiary item.

अख्याति : Prābhākara's theory of error.

अतिदेश : Borrowing from prakṛti to vikṛti.

अधिकार : Entitlement to perform sacrifice.

अध्ययनविधि : The injunction to study the Veda.

अध्यापनविधि : The injunction to teach the Veda.

अध्याहार : Supplementing to complete the meaning of a sentence. (Bhāṭṭas hold that the necessary word has to be supplemented while Prābhākaras say that the meaning has to be supplemented).

अन्वय : Syntactical connection.

अन्विताभिधानवाद : (i) The theory that the Vedic injunction conveys the kāryānvita meaning.

(ii) According to this theory the connected word meanings constitute the sentence meaning. The connection is included in the scope of the word meaning. Isolated words do not communicate.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ : Positive and negative verification.

अनुपलब्धि (अभावप्रमाण) : It is considered as a separate pramāṇa to cognise abhāva by Bhāṭṭas. Absence of cognition is the means of cognising abhāva i.e., the absence of an entity.

अनुव्यवसाय : Awareness of the knowledge obtained, the

knowledge of the knowledge. (This concept of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas is not acceptable to Prābhākaras. They accept self-revealing nature of the knowledge.)

अन्यथाख्याति : Nyāyavaiśeṣika theory of error. According to this theory one entity is mistaken to be another.

अपूर्वम् : (मानान्तरापूर्वम्) : The import of Vedic injunction. It is conveyed by Vedic injunction only. Therefore, it is called apūrva. It is also called kārya and niyoga. (This is Prābhākara meaning).

अपूर्वम् : (यागेन फलप्राप्तौ द्वारम्) A potency produced by yāga that leads to its result. A link between the yāga and svarga (This is Bhāṭṭas meanings.)

अभिधा : (Denotative power of a word, denotation of a word.

अभाव : One of the seven categories according to Nyāyavaiśeṣikas. It is a negative category against other positive categories (abhāva versus bhāva). It is of the nature of the absence of an entity. Prābhākaras do not accept this category.

अभ्यास : Repetition, it is one of the criterion to decide whether the sacrifices or rituals concerned are distinct.

अर्थवाद : A praise of the sacrifice or an item connected with it to impress upon the need of its performance. It provides prāśastyajñāna. In some cases, it also censures some item to indicate that this should be avoided. In this role it is called nindārthavāda.

अर्थापत्ति : One of the *pramāṇas* accepted by both *Bhāṭṭas* and *Prābhākaras*. *Nyāyavaiśeṣikas* include it in *anumāna*. It is utilized to resolve the conflict between two known facts by presuming the third fact.

अर्थसंस्पर्श : Meaning of a word agreeing with the fact conveyed by it.

अर्थासंस्पर्श : (अर्थव्यभिचारिता) Meaning of a word not agreeing with the fact conveyed by it.

अव्यपदेश्यम् : A perception stated in words is not a perception. *Vyapadeśya* means stated in words. For instance, after perceiving a colour, the statement made viz., This is colour, is not a perception. It is only a statement of perceptual cognition of colour.

आकाङ्क्षा : The injunction i.e., *niyoga*, seeking a *niyojya*, *viśaya*, *karāṇa* etc., to accomplish *kārya* is *ākāṅkṣā* according to *Prābhākaras*. Ordinarily this term is translated as expectancy. The nature of this expectancy is differently explained by *Anvitābhīdhanāvādins* and *Abhihitānvayavādins*. The injunction seeking the agent, object, instrument etc., is *ākāṅkṣa* in the former while the reciprocal expectancy of different word meanings to lead to the formation of the sentence meaning is *ākāṅkṣa* in the latter.

अर्थीभावना : The meaning of the injunctive suffix in its general capacity as a verbal suffix. It conveys *pravṛtti* i.e., proceeding to undertake the sacrifice.

आरादुपकारकम् : The *aṅgas* that assist the chief sacrifice without operating on other sacrificial items. *Prayāja* etc., rituals come under this category. The other category of *aṅgas* viz., *sannipatyopakāra*kas assist the chief sacrifice by operating on other items. *Prokṣaṇa*, *avaghāta* etc., come under this category.

इतिकर्तव्यता : The manner or the process of performing a sacrifice. Performance of *prayāja* etc., *aṅgas* constitutes this process.

उपादानम् : The process of *niyoga* getting connected with certain items by *ākṣepa*. In these cases direct expressions to connect these with the *niyoga* will not be available.

उपदेश : Directly stated by Vedic injunction.

उपमानम् : A *pramāṇa* that is utilized to cognise the similarity.

ऊह : Substitution. In the course of borrowing from *prakṛti* to *vikṛti* the substitution made to suit the requirements of *vikṛti* in respect of *mantra*, *sanskāra* etc., is called *ūha*.

एकदेश : A term used to refer to *hetu* in *Prābhākara* system.

एकदेशान्तरम् : A term used to refer to *sādhya* in *Prābhākara* system. These terms are used in *Śābarabhāṣya* also.

औत्पत्तिक सम्बन्ध : Natural relation between the word and meaning.

कार्यम् : The import of the Vedic injunction. It is also called apūrva and niyoga. It is of the nature of accomplishment of a task i.e., yāga.

कृति : (भावना) Initiative generated by the Vedic injunction in the mind of the person who has to undertake the sacrifice. Kārya is the chief import of Vedic injunction. Since, kārya has to be accomplished by kṛti, it is also included in the import of injunction. It is called bhāvanā. This is Prābhākara view of kṛti and bhāvanā. The Bhāṭṭas have a different scheme of śabdibhāvanā and ārthibhāvana.

क्रिया : (यागक्रिया) The programme of the sacrifice.

क्रत्वर्थ : The items that serve the purpose of yāga. These are in contrast with puruṣārtha that serve the requirement of the person who undertakes the sacrifice.

करण : The means to produce certain result. In the context of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, yāga is karaṇa. According to Prābhākaras it is both viśaya i.e., the subject, and karaṇa i.e., the instrument of kārya.

क्रियाकार्य : Ordinary injunctions convey kriyākārya while Vedic injunctions convey apūrvakārya.

कार्यैदमर्थम् : Serving the purpose of kārya.

कारकैदमर्थम् : Serving the purpose of kārakas.

(i) गुण : Quality, attribute.

(ii) गुण : Subordinate, in the Pūrvamīmāṃsa context.

(iii) गुण : One of the criterion to distinguish the sacrifices or rituals in Pūrvamīmāṃsa usage.

ग्राहकग्रहणम् : Solicited by the vedic injunction.

चोदना : The vedic injunction.

जाति : Universal.

तत्ताप्रमोष : Deletion of the reference to the time in the memory when rajata is remembered on seeing sūkti.

त्रिपुटीकरणम् : The formula of perceptual cognition evolved by Prābhākaras. The perceptual cognition covers the three i.e., knower, the object known, and the knowledge. Out of these three, the knowledge is self-revealing (svaprakāśa), while the object is comprehended through the knowledge. The cognition of the knower and the knowledge is perception. Prābhākaras do not confine the scope of perception to sense perception only. The knower and the knowledge are covered in all cognitions. The cognition of these is perception. This concept is closer to the sākṣi concept of Dvaita Vedānta. It dispenses with the need of anuvyavasāya of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas.

तन्त्र : Performance of a ritual item once only as applicable to many. For instance, yūpāhuti is performed only once for eleven yūpas.

नियोग : Direction, command. This is the import of Vedic injunction according to Prābhākaras. It generates the urge that 'This is my task.'

नियोज्य : A person who is directed by niyoga to undertake its accomplishment.

नियमविधि : Mandatory injunction.

नियतसम्बन्ध : Invariable association.

पुरुषार्थ : The sacrificial items that serve the person who has undertaken the sacrifice.

प्रकृति : The original sacrifice.

प्राकृतोपकार : The assistance rendered in prakṛti yāga.

प्रत्यक्षम् : Perception. This is not confined to sense perception only.

प्रधानम् : The main sacrifice.

(i) प्रमाणम् (भावसाधनम्) : Valid knowledge.

(ii) प्रमाणम् (करणसाधनम्) : The means of valid knowledge.

प्रतियोगिन् : A counter correlative. Ordinarily it is used in the sense of a counter correlative to abhāva. However, in several other contexts also the expressions anuyogin and pratiyogin are used to indicate an entity and its counter correlative. The contexts specify the roles played.

प्रवर्तना (प्रेरणा) : Impelling, directing. It is taken as the import of Vedic injunction in a section of Bhāṭṭas tradition.

बाध : Sublation.

बाध : Not implementing the prakṛti yāga items in vikṛtiyāga under certain circumstances. This is Pūrvamīmāṃsā usage.

भ्रम : Perceptual error.

प्रसङ्ग : When a ritual item performed with reference to one also serves another, it is called prasaṅga.

Serving more than one is involved both in tantra and prasaṅga. However, in tantra the purpose of serving more is the aim while in prasaṅga it is incidental.

यथार्थज्ञानम् : The cognition the content of which agrees with the fact conveyed.

यथार्थख्याति : The theory that even in the so called error the object cognised is true.

योग्यता : Compatibility of words to get syntactically connected.

याग : Dravya and devatā give a form to yāga.

यागैदमर्थम् : Serving the purpose of yāga, connected with yāga.

लिङ्गम् (हेतुः) Middle term in a syllogism.

लिङ्गम् (वस्तुसामर्थ्यम्) : One of the criterion to decide the aṅga status in Pūrvamīmāṃsā usage.

विकृति : A derivatory sacrifice or ritual.

विधि : Injunction. This is conveyed by liṅ i.e., optative suffix and also by tavya suffix.

विवेकाग्रहणम् : Non-realization of the difference between the two cognition idam and rajatam in the error. This is also termed as bheda-agraha.

वेद्य : The object of a cognition.

शेष : Subordinate.

शास्त्रप्रमाणम् (शब्दप्रमाणम्) The Veda only is śabda-pramāṇa. The statement of men are not śabdapramāṇa according to Prābhākaras. Therefore, śabdapramāṇa is called śāstrapramāṇa. For Bhāṭṭas both Veda and the statements of reliable persons are śabdapramāṇa.

विश्वजिज्ञ्याय : A ruling given in respect of viśvajid-yāga that the result i.e., svarga, has to be envisaged even if it is not stated. This ruling is adopted in similar cases.

रात्रिसत्रन्याय : A ruling given in the case of rātrisatra that the result stated in arthavāda be taken as the result of the sacrifice. This ruling is adopted in similar cases.

शक्ति : Potency. Every object has its own potency. This is called śakti. It is considered as a separate category by Prābhākaras.

शक्ति : The power of a word to convey its primary meaning.

सन्निधि : Proximity. It is not necessary that the proximity is that of a required word only. If the object concerned is brought to the mind that is sufficient. That is Prābhākara view of sannidhi.

स्वलक्षणम् : The core nature of an object.

समवाय : The relation of inherence.

स्वप्रकाशत्वम् : self revealing nature.

सादृश्यम् : Similarity. This is considered as a separate category by Prābhākaras.

सन्निपत्योपकारकम् : The āṅgas that assist the sacrifice by operating on kārakas. Prokṣaṇa, avaghāta etc., come under this category.

सविकल्पकज्ञानम् : The perceptual cognition in which the object and its attributes are presented organized as viśeṣya and viśeṣaṇa.

संस्कार : Purification, refinement.

ज्ञातता : The fact of an object being known. This fact is utilized by Bhāṭṭas to infer the knowledge.

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